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In this thesis, I investigate the economic linkages between internal labour migration and the 
welfare of migrant-sending households and communities. The analysis is couched in the new 
economics of labour migration theory, which recognises the familial participation in migration 
decisions and therefore the potential role of economic linkages between migrants and their 
original households.  The contribution of this thesis is made through three empirical essays. In 
the first essay (chapter two) , I employ descriptive techniques, and use nationally representative 
data from South Africa, to assess the contribution of remittances and other income sources 
into the composition of poverty and inequality indices. Remittances are generally a small part 
of the aggregate household income vector, contributing about 5 percent of the total. However, 
this income source is available to about one in five of rural African household and contributes 
substantially to their total income.  Since the decomposition methods do not establish 
causality, I employ regression techniques to examine the poverty impact of migration and 
remittances, in a second essay (chapter three).  Specifically, I address the question of what 
would happen to household poverty if the migrant had not if the migrant had stayed.   To this 
end, I use a treatment effects model which inherently addresses issues selectivity bias on the 
part of migrants.  Results from a cross-section data analysis suggest that migration has negative 
effects on consumption and hence poverty, at least in the short term.  In the third empirical 
chapter, I focus on individual remittance receivers and sender to unpack the factors that are 
associated with remittances.  The risk sharing motive, proxied by remittance receiver‟s reported 
state of health, does not find support in the data. Further, I find limited support for a gender 
effect on remittances and no evidence of the crowding out effect of private versus public 
transfers. Of interest is the observation that remittance exchanges are not necessarily the 
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domain of nucleus family members, but often involves a wider array of participants, mostly 
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1  Introduction 
1.1 Overview of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold:  firstly, to examine economic linkages between labour 
migrants and their original households and, secondly, to analyse the welfare impacts of labour 
migration on the individuals and households that are linked to economic migrants. Within the 
scope of the investigation, the thesis focuses on remittances as the main economic linkage 
between labour migrants and migrant-connected households in South Africa. More specifically, 
the thesis attempts to answer three questions:  what is the contribution of remittance income, 
in relation to other income sources, to household poverty and inequality?  Secondly, to what 
extent do remittances affect poverty in migrant-connected households?  And thirdly, what 
factors influence remittances income? 
Interrogating the nature and persistence of internal migration, in view of its linkages to poverty 
and inequality in South Africa, could have important policy implications. A deeper 
understanding of the interaction between migration and household welfare could assist social 
planners and policy makers in revising ineffective policies and better achieve its goals in the 
fight against poverty and economic disparities. Indeed, given South Africa‟s history with regard 
to migrant labour and the large numbers of migrant workers and remittance transfers, 
government plans and programs need to incorporate the potential effects of internal migration 
on the basis of rigorous research and evidence. 
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1.2 Background to migration and welfare of migrant-connected households 
Migration of labour has for many years been a key element of South Africa‟s labour markets 
and economic development. For a greater part of the twentieth century, labour migration 
within the country was closely regulated. To be specific, the apartheid1 system passed laws, such 
as the urban influx control legislation, which barred some sections of the society, notably the 
black, from settling in the economically productive parts of the country. Instead, the majority 
were to stay in rural homelands where employment opportunities were limited. In effect, these 
restrictions together with the contractual nature of employment particularly in mines, gave rise 
to temporary and circular migration: many migrant workers would retain a base in the 
household of origin (often rural), to which they returned every year (see Wilson, 1972; Kok et 
al, 2003; Posel, 2010).  Survival for many households depended on the economically active, 
mostly men, finding contractual employment in mines, in urban industry or on white-owned 
farms. ). The apartheid system thus ensured that the minority white population superseded 
other demographic groups and, as its legacy, supplanted a clear socioeconomic hierarchy far 
more unequal than most comparable societies (Treiman, 2005). 
However, since the fall of apartheid in the early 1990s, the country has witnessed important 
changes which have possibly changed the shape of labour migration trends and invariably 
impacted on urbanization as well as poverty and inequality. Among other events, the repeal of 
urban Influx Control legislation in the late 1980‟s, the subsequent and sustained decline in 
labour absorption capacity of the South African economy and the dramatic increase in the 
                                                 
1A system of racial segregation in South Africa enforced through legislation by the National 
Party (NP) governments, which ruled the country from 1948 to 1994. Apartheid policies 
defined four main racial groups in South Africa: blacks/Africans, Indians, Coloureds and 
Whites. Africans constitute approximately 75 percent of the South African populace. Under 




incidence of HIV-AIDS infections in the Southern African region have, in all likelihood, 
played a central role in the restructuring of labour migration streams. Recent trends in labour 
migration seem to suggest that internal labour migration has been on the increase. According 
to Posel and Casale (2006), labour migration within South Africa increased significantly in 
absolute terms between 1993 and 2002. The two authors argue that most of the increase was 
due to rural-to-urban migration, on account of limited employment and income generating 
activities in the rural areas. More recently, however, there is a suggestion from new survey data 
that a larger part of labour migrants could be changing preferences in favour of settling in 
destination areas rather than migrating temporarily (Posel, 2010). 
 
The gender aspect of migration also appears to be changing as female labour migration has 
also been on the rise. Whereas there was little change in the proportion of rural African men 
who were reported as labour migrants between 1993 and 1999, the proportion of African 
women identified as migrant members of rural households increased. Consequently, there was 
a small but identifiable shift in the gender composition of labour migrants in the 1990s: in 
1993, an estimated 30 percent of African migrant workers in South Africa were women; by 
1999, this had increased to approximately 34 percent.  During the same period, particularly 
after the transition from the apartheid regime to democratic rule, South Africa‟s development 
policy underwent some re-orientation, paying more attention to addressing issues of 
widespread poverty and inequality. 
 
In spite of the best intentions of the post-apartheid government to fight the socioeconomic 
challenges, there seems to have been persistence and possible worsening of both poverty and 
inequality. Leibbrandt et al (2010) show that the country‟s high aggregate level of income 
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inequality increased between 1993 and 2008 and that the same was true for inequality within 
each of South Africa‟s four major racial groups2.  There appears to be a consensus on these 
inequality findings as earlier studies also show that inequality had increased during the latter 
part of the 1990s (see Ardington et al., 2006). Other studies on the increasing inequality show 
inter-racial income disparities declined due to rising income for blacks. However, from intra-
racial inequality among the black population prevented a significant decline in aggregate 
inequality and poverty (van der Berg and Louw, 2004; Van der Berg et al, 2008). 
 
Linked to deepening inequality was persistent poverty. An analysis of income and expenditure 
data between 1995 and 2002 suggests that headcount3 poverty declined marginally from 51 
percent to 48 percent, but the actual number of people living below the poverty line increased 
by more than one million, while those living in extreme poverty – (living on less than one 
united states dollar a day) increased from 9.4 percent to 10.5 percent of the population.  
Leibbrandt et al (2010) find that although aggregate poverty slightly fell between 1993 and 
2008, the African and coloured population groups experienced deepening of poverty, implying 
those who were still in poverty were on average poorer than before. 
 
Against this background, there is a need to know more about the underlying causes of poverty 
and inequality: the factors that drive it and those which maintain it. More importantly, we need 
to know more about the ways in which disadvantaged people cope with poverty, and the 
strategies by which they try to escape. Furthermore, there is need to understand what shapes 
                                                 
2 White, Coloured, Asian/Indian and Black/African 




the success and the failure of these strategies. Migrant labour and remittances play a potentially 
important role in this regard. 
 
The importance of migration in the rural development context has recently been recognised in 
the theoretical literature. In the next section, I review some of the migration and development 
models. A separate but related body of literature, focusing primarily on remittances, is 
introduced and discussed in the fourth chapter. 
1.3 Migration and welfare: a theoretical context 
The literature on labour migration has largely concerned itself with explaining migration 
decisions and factors that sustain migration streams (see Lucas, 1997).  The dominant 
influence of economic factors is a standard theme, mostly focusing on the migrants 
themselves.  That, notwithstanding, the phenomenon has attracted research attention from 
diverse disciplines, including demography, sociology and geography.  In the rest of this section, 
I give an overview of the evolution of the various economic schools of thought on migration 
and, importantly for the purposes of this study, try to identify the economic linkages between 
migrants and their original households (or communities). 
1.3.1 The neoclassical approach to migration analysis  
Theoretical explanations of migration, specifically of the rural-urban type, can be traced back 
to Ravenstein‟s articles on the “laws of migration” (Ravenstein, 1885). According to these laws, 
differences in availability of opportunities between rural and urban areas are the main driving 
factor behind migration decisions.  The main tenets of the Ravenstein laws pertain to three 
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factors namely (i) distance as a regulating factor of migrant‟s choice of destination4 (ii) the 
existence and extent of return streams, and (iii) the role of trade and industry in accelerating 
the migration process.  
The first well-known economic model of development to include as an integral element the 
process of rural–urban labour transfer was that of Lewis (1954) and later extended by Fei and 
Ranis (1961). One version of the Lewis model considers migration as a wage equilibrating 
mechanism between labour-surplus and labour-deficit sectors. The Lewis model is, in this 
regard, based on the concept of a two-sector economy, comprising a subsistence (agricultural) 
sector characterized by underemployment, and a modern industrial sector characterized by full 
employment.  In  the  subsistence  sector,  the  marginal  productivity  of  labour  is  zero  (or  
very  low)  and workers are paid wages to their cost of subsistence, so wage rates in this sector 
barely  exceed marginal products. Because of high productivity or labour union pressures, 
wages in the modern urban sector are much higher. Migration occurs from the subsistence to 
the industrial sector as a response to the wage differential. This increases industrial production 
as well as the capitalists‟ profit. Since this profit is assumed to be reinvested in  the  industrial  
sector,  it  further  increases  the  demand  for  labour  from  the  subsistence sector. The  
process  continues  as  long  as  surplus  labour  exists  in  the  rural  areas  and  as long  as  this  
surplus  is  reflected  in  significantly different wage  levels .  It might continue indefinitely if 
the rate of population growth in the rural sector is greater than or equal to the rate of growth 
of demand for labour out-migration, but it must end eventually if the rate of growth of 
demand for labour in the urban area exceeds rural population growth.  
  
                                                 
4 Migrants tend to move to nearby places, often in a staged process leading eventually to 
longer-distance moves to bigger cities: in other words, step-migration. 
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Ranis and  Fei (1961) noted that the Lewis model failed to present a satisfactory analysis of the 
agricultural sector. Indeed, the sector has to grow if the mechanisms that Lewis designed were 
to continue without grinding to a premature halt.  They therefore enrich the dual economy 
model by, inter alia, pursuing this notion of the requirement of balance growth to a logically 
consistent definition of the end of the take-off process. 
 
 In spite of being highly acclaimed, two-sector model has come under more criticism. For 
instance, A major critique relates to the validity of the assumption  that  migration is induced 
solely  by  low  wages  and underemployment  in  rural  areas,  although  these  are  
undoubtedly  important  influences. Further, the assumption of a modern industrial sector in a 
developing country setting seemed rather unrealistic. In contrast,  rural–urban migrants would  
probably  not be entering  the  industrial  sector  but  picking  up  low-productivity  and  still  
quite  low-paid jobs in the informal economy of the city – for instance as street-vendors, casual 
laborers or  construction workers. Hence, it seemed that, whilst the Lewis model had the 
strength of being simple and  intuitively  attractive,  and whilst  it  did  seem  to  be    roughly   
conformed with  the historical  experience  of  economic/industrial  growth  in  the  West,  it  
has  some characteristics,  noted  above,  which  are  at  variance  with  the  realities  of  
development processes and rural–urban migration in many Third World countries (Todaro, 
1976).  
  
Sjaastad (1962) advanced a theory of migration which treats the decision to migrate as an  
investment  decision  involving  an  individual‟s  expected  costs  and  returns  over  time. 
Returns  comprise  both  monetary  and  non-monetary  components,  the  latter  including 
changes  in  psychological  benefits  as  a  result  of  location preferences. Similarly, costs 
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include both monetary and non-monetary costs.  Monetary costs include costs of 
transportation, disposal of property, wages foregone while in transit, and any training for a new 
job.  Psychological costs include leaving familiar surroundings, adopting new dietary habits and 
social customs, and so on.  Since these are difficult to measure, empirical  tests  in  general  
have  been  limited  to  the  income  and  other  quantifiable variables.  Sjaastad‟s  approach  
assumes  that  people  desire  to  maximize  their  net  real incomes over their productive life 
and can at least compute their net real income streams in the present place of residence as well 
as in all possible destinations; again the realism of  these  assumptions  can  be  questioned  
since  perfect  information  is  not  always  the case, by any means.  
  
Undoubtedly one of the most influential frameworks for understanding the driving forces 
behind rural–urban migration in developing countries is the model developed by Michael 
Todaro (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Todaro‟s  initiative was  stimulated  by  his  
observation  that  throughout  the  developing world, rates of rural–urban migration continue 
to exceed the rates of job creation and to surpass  greatly  the  capacity  of  both  industry  and  
urban  social  services  to  absorb  this labour  effectively.  He realized, along with many others, 
that rural–urban labour migration was no longer a beneficent or virtuous process solving 
simple inequalities in the spatial allocation of labour supply and demand.  
 
Todaro  suggested  that  the  decision  to migrate  includes  a  perception  by  the  potential 
migrant  of  an  expected  stream  of  income  which  depends  both  on  prevailing  urban 
wages  and  on  a  subjective  estimate  of  the  probability  of  obtaining  employment  in  the 
modern  urban  sector, which  is  assumed  to  be  based  on  the  urban  unemployment  rate 
(Todaro, 1969).  Todaro‟s model is both an extension of the human capital approach of 
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Sjaastad and an attempt to accommodate the more unrealistic assumptions of the dual 
economy model as regard Third World cities.  
  
According to the Todaro approach, migration rates in excess of the growth of urban job  
opportunities  are  not  only  possible,  but  rational  and  probable  in  the  face  of  continued 
and expected large positive urban–rural income differentials. High levels of rural–urban 
migration can continue even when urban unemployment rates are high and are known to 
potential migrants. Indeed Todaro (1976) outlines a situation in which a migrant will move 
even if that migrant ends up by being unemployed or receives a lower urban wage than the 
rural wage: this action is carried out because low wages or unemployment in the short  term  
are  expected  to  be more  than  compensated  by  higher  income  in  the  longer term  as  a  
result  of  broadening  urban  contacts and eventual access  to higher-paid  jobs. The approach 
therefore offers a possible explanation of a common paradox observed in Third World cities – 
continuing mass migration from rural areas despite persisting high unemployment in these 
cities.  
  
Todaro‟s  basic model  and  its  extensions  consider  the  urban  labour  force  in  developing 
countries  as  distributed  between  the  relatively  small modern  sector  and  a much  larger 
traditional  sector  (Harris  and  Todaro,  1970). Wage  rates  in  the  traditional  sector  are 
considered not to be subject to the partially non-market institutional forces that maintain high 
wages  in  the modern  sector but  to be determined competitively. As a result, they are 
substantially lower than those in the modern sector, but still significantly higher than in the 
traditional rural subsistence sector. Most urban in-migrants are assumed to be absorbed by the 




Apart from the methodological and conceptual problems of estimating expected incomes  
and  their  differentials  for  particular  origin  and  destination  areas,  a major weakness  of 
Todaro‟s model  is  its assumption that potential migrants are homogenous in respect of skills 
and attitudes and have sufficient information to work out the probability of finding a  job  in  
the  urban modern  sector. Despite the refinement of expected incomes, the model  remains  
one  based  on  the  notion  of  rational  and  well-informed  decision-making.  It  also  rests  
on  an  underlying  assumption  that  the migrants  aspire  to  become permanent  residents  in  
the  city,  and  ignores  other  forms  of  migration  or  mobility, including circular movement. 
Moreover, both the Todaro and the human investment models  do  not  consider  non-
economic  factors  and  abstract  themselves  from  the structural aspects  of  the  economy. A 
better understanding of the causes of migration requires an analysis of the macro-economic 
and institutional factors that generate rural–urban differentials.  A distinction is needed 
between socio-economic structural factors and the specific mechanisms (unemployment, wage 
differences et cetera.) through which the structural factors operate.  
1.3.2 A pluralistic approach 
The economics literature has traditionally treated migration as an individual decision motivated 
mainly by economic considerations. These theoretical foundations that we have looked at so 
far give flesh to this notion.  Over the past three decades, the  neoclassical  view  -  that 
migration decisions are exclusively a domain of the individual migrant  -   has  been  challenged  
by  an alternative paradigm that views migration decisions as a  collective outcome involving 
family and households (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991).  According to Stark, and others 
who have abridged his arguments, migration must often be seen as a family or group decision 
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which seeks to minimize risks and diversify resources rather than to maximize cash income 
alone. This strategy is viewed as a form of a o portfolio investment of the labour of the various 
members of the family in various places or positions in the origin  region  and  elsewhere  
(abroad,  or  a  town  or city  in  the home country). Importantly, it  involves widening  the  
focus  of  the  investigation  away  from  the  single,  individual migrant and puts emphasis  on 
channeling investment and consumption goods back to the home village rather than (as in the 
neoclassical model) on the economic progress of the migrant in the destination.  
 
Although  such  new  economics  approaches  have  generally  been  applied  to  the 
international  migration  context  (reflecting  the  dominant  concern  in  migration  studies 
with this form of movement in recent years), the principles apply almost equally well to 
internal migration  fields, especially within  large developing countries which are sharply 
differentiated  internally.  Massey et al.  (1998) explicitly recognize this when they state that   
However, apart from the more promising unit of analysis than that of the individual in a job 
lottery, the new economics seems to be firmly grounded in a functionalistic and individualistic 
economic framework (de Haan, 2006). The migration decision is presented as a household 
strategy, representing the congruent interests of all household members.  Limited attention is 
paid to the non-economic factors that drive such decisions (Posel, 2002). 
1.3.3 The institutional approach 
Further departing from individual or behavioural models of migration are analyses that 
emphasise the institutions that are determining for migration. Migration decisions are viewed 
as part of a continuing effort, consistent with traditional values, to solve recurrent problems to 
do with a balance between available resources and population numbers.  Proponents of the 
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institutional approach accept that the migration decisions are made primarily as a risk 
minimising objective. However, they argue further choice must take into consideration a set of 
conventions, rules, norms and value systems that are specific to each society and constitute the 
institutional context of the migration process (Guilmoto and Sandron, 2001). 
 
The institutional approach shows some important limitations that the neoclassical theories 
appear to overlook.  That is, migration does not approximate a lottery and migration options 
are not open to everybody. Further, people do not move en-masse forced by economic or 
political factors. Rather, migration streams are highly segmented, and people‟s networks, 
preceding migrations and various social institutions determine, to a large extent, which 
migrates, and from which areas. An important implication of this aspect of migrations is that 
the gains accruing from migration, whether to the migrant himself or to those connected to 
him, are not distributed equally. 
1.3.4 Summary 
In a nutshell then, the migration literature has evolved from migrant- focused theories in the 
early twentieth century to bring to the core the welfare of those who remain behind but remain 
connected to migrants after the migration decision has been implemented.  This theoretical 
discourse, therefore, demonstrates the growing recognition of migration as a family livelihood 
strategy and hence as a potential welfare change factor. 
13 
 
1.4 Purpose and Motivation of the study 
In the foreseeable future, internal migration will continue to play a key role in South Africa‟s 
labour market and in the search for better livelihoods. However, labour migration within 
national boundaries continues to receive marginal attention in discussions and debates on 
development policy. Among other reasons, this marginalization emanates from lack of in-
depth studies, which in turn is due to data limitations in some cases and the complexity of the 
migration-development nexus (de Haan, 2006).  Although this challenge is common in the 
developing world, its manifestations and solutions are dependent on country-specific 
characteristics. However, the issue needs to receive more attention particularly considering the 
potentially important role that migration plays in alleviating poverty as well as its close linkage 
to the HIV-AIDS pandemic. The South African context is appropriate as the country 
continues to face growing income inequality and entrenched poverty in the rural areas. 
Research on internal migration in South Africa since the abolition of influx control remains 
scanty, despite the importance that migrant labour markets offer to the economy. The present 
study therefore makes a contribution by attempting to fill these knowledge gaps in the context 
of the South African economy. 
 
1.5 Hypotheses and Methods 
The background analysis above has attempted to show linkages between migration and 
household welfare as well as highlight the potential significance of migration to rural 
households in developing countries, with a special reference to South Africa. In this regard, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
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 Labour migration improves household welfare among rural black South Africans by 
reducing income poverty.  
 Labour migration reduces income inequality between rural black households. 
 Migrants‟ remittances are motivated by familial motives. That is, families diversify their 
income source through labour migration, which in turn implies that remittances are 
motivated by the insurance motive. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
To assess the contribution of various income sources to household welfare, the thesis applies 
decomposition techniques to a standard Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) poverty index 
and a Gini inequality index.  Despite the fact that remittances are a relatively small component 
of the total income vector, decomposition results indicate that they are not an ignorable source 
of income for poor households and are associated with lower levels of income poverty and 
inequality.  
 
After a rigorous assessment of the contribution of various incomes to household welfare, the 
thesis proceeds in the third chapter to test the hypothesis that labour migration and 
remittances reduce poverty in South Africa by investigating the poverty impact of remittances 
on migrant-connected households using an econometric model of household consumption 
expenditure. The pertinent question is how households would fair if migrants had not left, 
hence attempts to estimate a counterfactual income distribution. I use a treatment effects 
model of household per capita expenditure in order to account for the possibility of self-
selection on the part of migrant households. I find evidence of sample selectivity, where 
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households that would naturally be exposed to higher welfare outcomes are more likely to 
participate in migration and receive remittances. However, the (short term) impact of 
remittances on household welfare is negative. It is likely that although many migrant 
households are not in the higher brackets of income distribution, the most indigent 
households are not able to participate in migration. This result supports Gelderbloom (2007) 
who suggested that poverty constrains migration in South Africa. In the fourth chapter, I turn 
to the question of what factors influence remittance levels. I employ descriptive methods to 
profile remittance senders and recipients, as well as remittance flows. An econometric model 
of remittance income is then used to identify the individual and household level characteristics 
of remittance income. I find evidence of the insurance motive in remittance variation. 
Although circular migration is perceived to have declined, higher levels of remittances are 
associated with couples, often the husband supporting sending to his wife as a familial 
obligation. Further, the hypothesis that genetic relatedness predicts remittances is confirmed.  
Chapter 5 summarises findings from the study and discusses possible implications emanating 




2  The Effect of  Remittances on Household Income Poverty 
and Inequality 
2.1 Introduction 
Private resource transfers play an essential role in the livelihoods and survival of many poor 
people in developing countries. Remittances, for instance, provide a means of achieving 
consumption smoothing and alleviating liquidity constraints (Taylor and Rozelle, 2003; Yang 
and Choi, 2007), thus availing a vital economic linkage between labour migrants and their 
original households.  Moreover, international evidence supports the view that remittances from 
migrants have the potential to spatially redistribute income and relieve some income 
inequalities (de Haan, 2006) suggesting further that economic migration has a strong 
relationship with poverty and social exclusion.    
In South Africa, like in most parts of the developing world, these transfers are believed to 
constitute a significant share of household income for many indigent households (Posel, 2001; 
Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001). Although there is a large literature focusing primarily on the 
motives behind remittances and the relationship between public and private transfers (Cox, 
Hansen and Jimenez, 2003; Jensen, 2003), the welfare impacts of remittances at the household 
level remain relatively understudied (Dimolva and Wolff, 2008). An understanding of the 
distribution and possible impacts of remittances is crucial for sound public policy design 
because, among other things, such transfers provide social and economic benefits similar to 
those of public programs (Cox and Jimenez, 1990).  
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Moreover, the South African case deserves attention from development researchers because of 
the significantly high levels of economic inequality and poverty, particularly among previously 
disadvantaged demographic groups.  Since the early 1990s, South Africa‟s public policy has 
been re-shaped to pay more attention to addressing issues of widespread poverty and 
inequality (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006). For instance, coverage of the means tested old age 
pensions was expanded in 1993 to include elderly Africans (Case and Deaton, 1998). The 
rolling out of child support grants in the late 1990s further enhanced access to disposable 
income by low income households (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2010). 
In the case of poverty, while there is contention over the magnitudes, there is a broad 
consensus over the direction. This consensus suggests that poverty was either constant or 
worsened slightly between 1994 and 2001, and then began to improve as the impact of the  
new child support grants came to be felt (van der Berg, Burger, Louw and Yu, 2005; Meth, 
2006; Leibbrandt and Levinsohn, 2011). In addition, while the various state interventions have 
had positive impacts on poverty, there is documented evidence that state pensions tend to 
crowd out private transfers (Jensen, 2003).  
The present chapter uses nationally representative household data sets to explore the extent of 
inter-household economic linkages as manifest in remittance flows. Through an investigation 
of remittance flows and their contribution as an income source to income inequality and 
poverty in rural South Africa, this chapter assesses whether remittances, and hence work-
related migration, are important to poor households.  
The chapter proceeds in four further parts. Part 2.2 discusses relevant empirical literature, 
focusing on poverty and inequality impacts of remittances. Section 2.3 presents data and 
definitions. Thereafter, section 2.4 discusses analytical tools for decomposing poverty and 
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inequality indices while sections 2.5 and 2.6 presents empirical results for poverty impacts and 
redistributive effects. The chapter concludes with section 2.7.  
2.2 Related literature on remittances and household welfare 
2.2.1 Remittances and income disparities 
One strand of the literature on migration and welfare focuses on the relationship between 
migrants‟ remittances and household income disparities in migrant sending regions. However, 
empirical studies on the topic often yield conflicting results and there appears to be no strong 
consensus on both the direction and magnitude of the redistributive impact of remittances. 
Remittances sometimes go disproportionately to better-off households, and so, widen 
disparities, but in other cases they appear to target the less well off, causing disparities to 
shrink (Taylor and Wyatt, 1996).  
Conflicting results are also shown in a recent study by Lopez-Feldman, Mora and Taylor 
(2007) who find that remittances increased inequality in Mexico when considered at national 
level, while contributing positively (to inequality reduction) in some regions of the same 
country.  Adams (1989) finds that income inequality declined with increasing remittances in 
rural Egypt, but the same author (Adams,1996) finds that internal remittances have a positive 
effect on equality while international remittances have a negative effect rural Pakistan, yielding 
in sum  a neutral effect on overall inequality.   
It would seem that calculations that impute incomes for the erstwhile migrants, had they stayed 
and worked at home, tend to show an increase in inequality from the combined effect of 
migration and remittances. For example, inequality was found to have increased in Bluefields, 
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Nicaragua, when an imputation was made for the lost domestic income of migrants, but it fell 
when the domestic income of migrants was ignored (Barham and Boucher, 1998). Two recent 
studies, however, did not find an increase in inequality even after controlling for the 
counterfactual income loss from migration. Adams (2005) finds that the inclusion of 
international remittances in household expenditures among Ghanaian households leads to only 
a slight increase in income inequality, with the Gini coefficient remaining relatively stable, 
between 0.38 and 0.40. De and Ratha (2005) report that in Sri Lanka, the Gini coefficient 
drops from 0.46 to 0.40 because of remittance receipt. 
Differences in findings on the impact of remittances on inequality also stem from varying 
geographic and historic circumstances, such as the distance from high-income destinations and 
the prevalence of networks of earlier migrants (Ratha, 2006). The cost of migration tends to be 
lower for shorter distance destinations and where migrant networks are well established. 
Consequently, migration becomes available as an option for poorer households. For a case in 
point,  remittances to a Mexican village with a well-established history of international 
migration had an equalizing effect, whereas remittances to another Mexican village for which 
international migration was a relatively new phenomenon tended to make the distribution of 
income more unequal (Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki, 1986). For a large number of Mexican 
communities, the overall impact of migration and remittances is estimated to reduce inequality 
for communities with relatively high levels of past migration (McKenzie and Rapoport 2004).  
In addition, differences in outcomes may stem from methodological differences. Bardan and 
Boucher (1998) identify two key sources of methodological variation, namely the specific 
economic question being asked and the econometric or statistical techniques used to generate 
estimates of income and income distributions. Variation in the economic question under 
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investigation arises, because remittances can be treated, in effect, as an exogenous transfer by 
migrants or as a potential substitute for home earnings. When treated as an exogenous transfer, 
the economic question is how remittances, in total or on the margin, affect the observed 
income distribution in the receiving community. When treated as a potential substitute for 
home earnings, the economic question becomes how the observed income distribution 
compares to a counterfactual scenario without migration and remittances but including an 
imputation for home earnings of erstwhile migrants. 
The overall impact of migration on economic inequality at origin is a priori indeterminate and 
largely depends on where migrants are drawn from in the initial wealth distribution, and on the 
impacts of their migration decisions on other community members. If migration costs are 
sizeable, migrants will be initially primarily drawn from households in the upper or middle 
brackets of the community‟s wealth distribution, causing inequality to initially increase as such 
households get richer from income earned abroad. In contrast, if migration costs are low or 
liquidity constraints do not bind, the lower part of the distribution is also able to migrate, 
resulting in a more neutral or even inequality reducing effect of migration income. The 
migration diffusion theory put forward by Stark et al (1986) provides some basis for the 
various as well as conflicting results. At the beginning of the migration diffusion process, 
migration may only be available to well off households. Consequently, remittances would only 
increase the income gap, hence become unequalising, since they would only accrue to 
households that are already better off. If income becomes diffused to households at the lower 
end of the income distribution, remittances might become less unequalising and possibly 
equalising.  I demonstrate, after introducing analytical tools for Gini inequality index 
decomposition (in section 2.4.3 below), how the migration diffusion hypothesis relates to 
indeterminate  inequality changes in a dynamic environment. 
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2.2.2 Remittances and Poverty 
It is notable that, unlike the case of income inequality, the literature has paid less attention to 
analysing the impacts of migration and remittances on household poverty. Adams (2004) 
blames two factors for this dearth in the international literature, namely difficulties in 
estimating accurate and meaningful poverty levels in developing countries and the absence of 
useful data on the size and volume of remittances. 
The impacts of migration related remittances on poverty could be located between two 
possible extremes, according to Taylor et al. (2005). At one end is the optimistic scenario where 
migration reduces poverty in migrant-source areas by shifting population from the low-income 
rural sector to the relatively high-income urban economy. Income remittances by migrants 
contribute to incomes of households in migrant-source areas. Conditional on remittances 
being significantly sizable for the beneficiary households, remittances should necessarily reduce 
poverty. The other extreme describes a „pessimistic‟ scenario where poor households face 
liquidity, risk, and perhaps other constraints that limit their access to migrant labour markets. 
This scenario holds particularly for international migration, which usually entails high 
transportation and entry costs. Households and individuals participating in migration benefit, 
but these beneficiaries of migration may not include the rural poor. If migration is costly and 
risky, at least initially, migrants may come from the middle or upper segments of the source-
areas‟ income distribution, rather than from the poorest households. Consequently, the poor 
will not benefit unless obstacles to their participation in migration weaken over time.  
This latter perspective finds empirical precedence in Reardon and Taylor (1996), who 
examined the impacts of agro climatic shocks on both income inequality and poverty in rural 
Burkina Faso. Using simulations of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index before and 
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after a severe drought, one of their findings revealed that remittances and other off-farm 
income, failed to shield poor households against agro climatic risks mainly because the poor 
lacked access to off-farm income.  However, when the poor have access to remittances, the 
effect differs. Adams (2004) finds that both internal and international remittances reduce the 
headcount incidence, depth and severity of poverty in Guatemala. This was largely true 
because households in the lowest income decile received a very large share of their total 
household income from remittances. Indeed, when these „poorest of the poor‟ households 
receive remittances, their income status changes dramatically with a potentially large effect on 
any poverty measure that considers the number, distance and distribution of poor households 
beneath the poverty line. Not surprisingly, Adams finds that remittances have a greater impact 
on reducing the severity as opposed to the level of poverty in Guatemala. Similar results are 
shown in a multi-country study of seventy-one developing countries, where Adams and Page 
(2005) show that international remittances significantly reduce poverty in the developing 
world.  
There are very few studies that have explored the impacts of remittances on poverty in South 
Africa. This lacuna is often appropriated by the lack of comprehensive and nationally 
representative data on migration and remittances.  Posel and Casale (2005) attempts to link 
household poverty to internal migration in South Africa. Their descriptive analysis from 
multiple data sources shows that the majority of rural migrant households, which are mainly 
African, are found both to be poor and significantly poorer than non-migrant households. 
However, the authors do not find enough evidence to decipher any causal impact of internal 
migration and remittances on poverty. However, the relative importance and possible poverty 
impacts of remittances to rural households are highlighted by Woolard and Klaasen (2005), 
who find that changes in remittance income accounted for around 10 percent of household 
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transitions into and out of poverty in KwaZulu-Natal province between 1993 and 1998. This 
finding corroborates the results of Maitra and Ray (2003) who show that remittances were 
positively associated with household consumption expenditures.  
In summary then, whereas there is no strong agreement on the direction of impacts of 
remittances on income inequality, there appears to be more agreement on the poverty 
reduction impacts of remittance receipt.  This essay uses descriptive techniques to decompose 
poverty and inequality indices. FGT indices are decomposed using the Shorrocks (1999) 
approach, where Shapley value algorithm is employed. To decompose Gini coefficient of 
inequality, I use the algorithm of Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). The migration impact on 
welfare and poverty is extended using econometric analysis in the next chapter. 
2.3 Remittances: Data, definitions and distribution  
2.3.1 Data Sources 
Since the early 1990s, Statistics South Africa has been fielding a number of nationally 
representative surveys to collect data on various aspects of households‟ socio-economic 
conditions. In the present chapter, I use data from two editions of the Income and 
Expenditure survey (IES), which has been fielded on a five yearly basis since 1995. The IES 
instrument is designed to solicit information pertaining to household expenditures, but also 
includes a detailed section on incomes, both regular and otherwise, accruing to households 
over a specified period. To date, four rounds of the IES have been conducted since 1995, with 
about 28,000 households sampled in 1995 and a thousand less in 2000. However, the IES is 
not a panel survey and hence not directly comparable between the different waves. In addition, 
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the survey methodology was changed in subsequent versions5 which meant that information 
contained in the new dataset differed even more from the earlier editions. For this reason, 
most of the work using the IES has been limited to static analysis. 
For the purpose of this chapter, an attractive feature of the IES is that it contains a fair amount 
of detail pertaining to the categories and magnitudes of income sources accruing to households 
over one year prior to the date of survey.  Market returns, both from the labour market 
productivity and household business transactions, are a prominent feature in the IES. In 
addition, the state provides social transfers in the form of old age pensions, disability and child 
grants, which form another substantial part of household income. Private transfers, including 
regular income from non-resident family members and marital maintenance, are also recorded 
in the IES. Many South African households also received other incomes in the form of 
irregular or windfall events.  
In the present chapter, I use the same categorisation but combine some of the components, 
largely in line with standard practice in previous studies (see, for example, Leibbrandt et al, 
2001a). The categorisation includes the following:   
1. Wages include labour incomes such as salaries, bonuses and overtime income.  
2. Remittances defined in the IES survey instruments as regular incomes from family 
members living elsewhere; also includes alimony.   
3. I define Capital to include market contributions to household incomes by way of 
profits from business, professional earnings, and farming on full time, rents, royalties, 
interest and annuities.  
                                                 
5 Since the 2000 survey,  there has been two more rounds in 2005/6 and 2010/11  
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4. In the category of state transfers, I include two separate components namely social 
pension and state grants; the latter includes disability and child grants, and workmen‟s 
compensation.  
5. A sixth income category includes private pensions.  
6. Finally, there is an array of other incomes, which flow into the household but mostly at 
no regular intervals. Included in this category are incomes from hobbies, sale of assets, 
gratuities and claims.  
2.3.2 Shares of income sources  
Even though one fifth of households receive remittances, this source of income contributes 
only a small proportion of total income. In 1995, remittances amounted to an average of 4 
percent of total income for African households and 6 percent among those living in rural 
areas.  In the 2000 sample, remittance households represented 6 percent of total income for 
African households and 8 percent among rural African households. 
Table 2.1: Shares of total household income sources 
Income source 1995 2000 
 All Rural All Rural 
Wages 0.632 0.553 0.710 0.633 
Capital 0.065 0.061 0.048 0.047 
Private pension 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.008 
Social pension 0.057 0.087 0.046 0.084 
Grants 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.019 
Remittances 0.042 0.062 0.059 0.078 
Other  0.178 0.207 0.111 0.131 
Total income     
Source: author‟s calculations using IES (1995, 2000) 
Labour market incomes, in the form of wages and salaries, contribute the largest share of 
income at 63 percent of total income in the 1995 sample and 71 percent in the 2000 sample. 
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However, rural households depended less on wages and private pensions, in favour of 
remittances and social grants (including public pensions), when compared with the full sample. 
In order to assess poverty changes due to the inflow income from these sources, it is also 
essential to define the poor in South Africa. A commonly agreed upon poverty line has 
remained elusive in South Africa (Posel and Casale, 2005). Various poverty lines, both absolute 
and relative, have been used in different studies. In their recent work, Hoogeveen and Özler 
(2006) draw normative poverty lines using the cost of basic needs approach. According to their 
calculations, a suitable poverty line for South Africa must lie between R322 and R593 per 
capita per month in 2000 prices. In addition, they also use the US $2/day poverty line for 
purposes of international comparison and in order to describe what is happening to the 
welfare of those at the bottom end of the distribution. The latter equates to R174 per month in 
year 2000 prices. I use both the Hoogeveen and Özler (2006) lower bound (of R322 per 
month) as our poverty line and the two United States dollars per day to define deep poverty. 
My categorization of poor and non-poor households is based on per capita real incomes, 
computed from the total household nominal income and weighing all household members 
equally.   
2.3.3 Who receives remittances?  
According to the IES, the proportion of households that reported positive remittances as part 
of their regular income was between 12 and 18 percent in 1995 and 2000 with a substantial 
share of remittance households identified as African/Black6 households. Table 2.2 below 
shows that at least one in every five Black households reported that they received remittances 
                                                 
6 In the IES and other surveys, households are categorised into four races, namely African, Coloured, 
Asian/Indian and White. These are determined by the race of the household head. 
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on a regular basis, compared to 9 percent among Asians, 7 percent among Coloured and only 5 
percent among White South Africans in 2000. The distribution pattern was very similar in the 
1995 survey where 15 percent Blacks received remittances compared to 5 percent among 
Coloureds and Asians and 3 percent among White people. This observation is quite important 
in that any disregard of racial differences could downplay the possible significance of 
remittances.  
Table 2.2: Share of households receiving remittances by race and year 
 1995 2000 
Population  
Group 
National Rural National Rural 
All  11.3 15.6 19.3 25.3 
black/African 15.1 17.8 20.9 27.1 
coloured 5.5 1.5 7.8 4.9 
Asian 5.8 1.3 9.3 6.6 
White 2.9 2.0 5.0 3.0 
Source: author‟s calculations using data from STATS SA (IES 1995, 2000) 
These differences also feature prominently in terms of the rural-urban divide. In both surveys, 
remittance receipt is significantly rendered a rural phenomenon, with (proportionately) twice as 
many remittance-receiving households in rural areas as in the urban areas. For instance, 15.6 
percent of rural households received remittances in 1995 as compared to only 8 percent among 
urban households. The 2000 survey recorded a larger proportion of households, both urban 
and rural, as recipients of remittances. Unsurprisingly, some previous studies (Leibbrandt, 
Woolard and Woolard, 2000; Lu and Treiman, 2007) have focused on African/Black (and 
rural) households. 
The impact of remittances on the distribution of income is displayed graphically using density 
functions in figures 2.1 and 2.2 (below). The densities plot the proportion of households 
against their respective (natural logarithm of) per capita household income all African 
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households. In addition, a vertical line representing the Poverty Line of R322 per person per 
month is also shown. This is revealing as to where the addition of remittance income makes a 
difference in the distribution of household income. In both cases, the lower (left) tail of the 
distribution  shifts further left when remittance are not included, essentially indicating that it is 
mostly households/individuals in the middle and lower quintiles (the poor) who benefit from 
this income source.  
  
Figure 2.1: Income distribution for African households, 1995 and 2000   
 
The suggestion that the poor benefit most can also be observed from the mean incomes of 
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Table 2.3 below shows the average incomes for households that reported positive remittance 
receipt7. It is interesting to note that for remittance households, a substantial amount of their 
total incomes comes from remittances. For instance, an average remittance household in the 
first income decile gets over 70 percent of its monthly income as remittances.  
These observations point to a high level of dependency on remittances for those households, 
which receive remittances. This observation also sharply contradicts the belief that remittances 
are generally a negligible component of household income. 
 
Table 2.3: Mean total and remittance incomes by income decile for remittance households in 
Rural South Africa 
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7 Since there are many households that do not receive any remittances, the idea behind focusing on receiving 
household only is to show  whether or not remittances are a substantial proportion of total income among  those 
who actually receive positive amounts 
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(48855) (4528) (19536) (150) 
Notes:  
1. Source: Author‟s calculations, using IES (1995, 2000);  
2. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  
3. Income deciles computed using per capita income.  1 represents lowest 10% and 10 are 
highest 10%. 
2.3.4 Summary 
While remittances contribute only about 5 of aggregate household income, they comprise a 
significant proportion of income particularly for indigent households. The IES data also shows 
that remittances are significantly biased towards rural and African households, when compared 
with their white, coloured and Asian counterpart. In the ensuing sections and the rest of the 
study, therefore, I focus mainly on the rural African households. 
2.4 Analytical tools for decomposing poverty and inequality indices by income 
source  
In this section, I introduce the decomposition techniques that are used to compute the direct 
impacts of remittances on poverty and income inequality. I discuss, in the first instance, the 
FGT poverty index and its decomposition by income source before proceeding into a similar 
exposition of the Gini inequality index and its decomposition. 
2.4.1 The FGT Poverty Index 
In poverty analysis, the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) family of indices has become the 
standard metric for poverty analysis. The FGT poverty measure can be expressed as  
     (   )  
 
   
∑   
  
       (2-1) 
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where    is per capita household income, z is a predetermined income threshold that categorises 
households as income poor or otherwise, and   is a poverty aversion parameter which 
captures the sensitivity of the index to changes in income.    .
   
 
/ is the income shortfall 
(the gap between the household income and poverty line) of the  th poor household. 
As is well known,     is the poverty headcount index representing the proportion of the 
population whose income falls below the poverty line. The headcount ratio, while intuitive and 
easy to interpret, treats poverty as a discrete rather than a continuous characteristic and 
consequently fails to account for changes in poverty below a given poverty line. Indeed, if the 
incomes of the very poor increase but not enough to put them above the poverty line, the 
headcount index is unaffected poverty line. However, for any    equalling or in excess of unity, 
    becomes increasingly sensitive to the distribution of incomes among the poor. Hence, in 
order to provide a complete picture of how poverty changes under different scenarios, the 
poverty gap index,  , and poverty severity (  ) measures are used in addition to the headcount 
measure. The poverty gap index measures the extent to which individuals fall below the 
poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. 
Decomposition of FGT poverty Index 
 
The FGT poverty index is decomposable in various dimensions which enable the overall level 
of poverty to be allocated among subgroups of the population, such as those defined by 
geographical region, household composition, and labour market characteristics (see Duclos 
and Araar, 2006).   
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While the poverty indices are informative in and of themselves, a further interest in static 
analysis pertains to the roles of various income sources in producing a given level of poverty. 
Indeed, of interest to policy makers would be changes in the levels of poverty and the causes 
of such changes. One uncomplicated way of estimating the impact of changes in poverty due 
to a change in one income source involves arbitrarily changing the given source by some 
percentage and observing the resultant poverty level.  Reardon and Taylor (1996), for instance, 
assume a 10 percent change in non-farm incomes and examine changes in the three variants of 
the poverty index. Clearly, such an exercise does not indicate where the income source change 
came from and cannot account for changes that would have happened in other income sources 
as a result of the same.  
Shorrocks (1999) proposes an algorithm that computes the exact and additive contribution of 
various factors to a level of poverty or indeed its change. The basic idea originates from the 
classic question in cooperative game theory which asks how a certain amount of output, for 
instance, should be allocated among a set of contributors.  When applied in welfare analysis, 
one possible question would be how much poverty (or inequality) is reduced by the inflow of 
any particular income component.  
Ordinarily, the contribution of an income source to poverty alleviation can be given by the fall 
in poverty caused by the mean of that particular component after it is added to initial income. 
However, this fall in poverty necessarily depends on what the initial income was and thus the 
procedure defaults into a path dependency difficulty. Invoking the Shapley value (Shapley, 
1953) algorithm can circumvent this difficulty (Duclos and Araar, 2006). The Shapley 
procedure consists in computing the marginal effect on such indices by removing each 
33 
 
contributing factor in a particular sequence of elimination and assigning to each factor the 
average of its marginal contributions.  
Formally, suppose that y is a vector of all household income sources (               ). 
We can group some income sources into a subset S of Y (   )  and let    be a strict subset 
of Y that does not include    , that is, (    *  +). Further, let     (    ) be a characteristic 
function that equals zero if    is empty (that is,    (   )   ). For any non-empty subset   , 
the function      (    ) estimates the contribution of the welfare elements included in    to 
total poverty change (    (   ) ), regardless of the effect of that any external     may have.  
It is notable that some elements of    may contribute more to    (    )  than others. The 
Shapley value induces a rule    ( )  that allocates to each income source a weighted mean of 
the source‟s marginal incremental contribution to overall poverty reduction (Bibi and Duclos, 
2008).  
The poverty reduction that income source    contributes, given the characteristic function, is  
       (    )  
 
 (   ) 
∑ ,  (  
  *  +  )     (  
   )-    (2-2) 
 
where R crosses through the possible  (   )  permutations of Y and   
    *  + is the 
subset of all income sources preceding    in the order k. The terms in square brackets in 
equation (2.2) represent the difference in poverty resulting from introducing any income 
source    to a household‟s income vector. By repeating the computation for all possible 




Poverty effectiveness of income sources 
Equation (2.2) above gives the absolute contribution of income source    to poverty reduction. 
The absolute impact, however, is highly correlated with the size and distribution of the various 
income sources. That is to say, income sources with large values and wider distribution have 
larger absolute impacts and the converse necessarily holds true for those with smaller means 
and distributions. It is important, therefore, to adjust the absolute or relative contributions so 
that they reflect the effectiveness in reducing the poverty incidence and deficit.  
Bibi and Duclos (2008) propose a poverty effectiveness measure, which integrates the 
budgetary cost that an income source generates with the poverty change that it contributes.  
This, they suggest, can be done by deflating the absolute contribution by a measure of their 
size, the mean for instance. 
To formalise ideas, consider   
  as income from source,         )  Then the mean of   
  , 
expressed as a percentage of the predetermined poverty line , z , is 
   ̅  
   
 
∫   
   
 
   (  
 )    (2-3) 
where   ( ) is a cumulative density function.  The ratio of    (    ) to  ̅  yields  
   (    )      
  (    )
  ̅
     (2-4) 
 
the poverty impact of income source   for a value of  ̅  equal to the poverty line. In equation 
(2.10),      (    ) , depending on whether the income source     is positive or negative. It 
necessarily follows that whenever    (    )     (    ) , each rand received as income 
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source   reduces poverty more than the same rand received as income source j, both estimated 
at income poverty line z. 
2.4.2 Income source decomposition of Gini Inequality Index  
 Among the many inequality measures, the Gini coefficient has been the most often used in 
empirical work (Fields, 2001). For nonnegative incomes, the Gini coefficient takes values 
between 0 and 1, where the lower extreme represents absolute income equality and the top 
limit is indicative on perfect inequality. One attractive feature of the Gini coefficient is that it 
can be decomposed in terms of the contribution of various income sources. In order to 
disaggregate the Gini index in terms of the contributory income components, I use the 
notation of Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) for a general expression for the Gini index as  
   ( )   
     (         ( )    )
 
     (2-5)  
where y is per capita household income, distributed by function F(.) and has mean.  v is a 
parameter representing degree of equity. In the special case where v takes the value of 2, 
  ( )   
     (     ( ))
 
  turns out to be the well known Gini coefficient. 
Allowing    to be household income from income source i, where (i=1,2,3,…n) ,  the Gini 
coefficient in equation (2.1) can be expressed as a sum of the covariance of the various income 
sources with the cumulative income distribution, written as    
 
           
 ∑    (   ( ))    
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   (    (  ))
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1   (2-6) 
 
which, in turn,  can be abbreviated to 
   ∑       
 
         (2-7) 
 
where    represents the share of income source k in total income; the second term,    , is the 
Gini coefficient corresponding to the distribution of income component i;  and    is the 
correlation of income from source i with total income.  
The relationship between these three terms has a clear and intuitive interpretation. The 
influence of any income component upon total income inequality depends on how important 
the income source is with respect to total income (si); how equally or unequally distributed the 
income source is (gi); and the extent to which each income source is correlated with total 
income (ri).  The larger the product of these three components, the greater the contribution of 
income source k to total inequality as measured by g. si and gi are necessarily positive and not 
greater than one, while ri can fall anywhere in the range [-1,1] since it shows how income from 
source i is correlated with total income. 
By using this particular method of the Gini decomposition, it is possible to estimate the effect 
of small changes in a specific income source on inequality, holding income from other sources 
constant (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985). The partial derivative of the Gini coefficient with 
respect to a percent change in source k is equal to      





   (      )       (2-8) 
 
where g is the Gini coefficient of total income inequality prior to income change. Dividing 
through equation (6) by g, we get an expression for the percentage change in inequality 
resulting from a small percentage change in income from source k 





  (      )
 
       (2-9) 
 
The right hand side of equation (2.9) represents the excess of the original contribution of 
source k to income inequality over source  ‟s share of total income. The usefulness of this 
decomposition is attested to by its wide usage (Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard, 2000; 
Lopez-Feldman, Mora and Taylor, 2007).  
However, it is instructive to note that the Gini inequality decomposition, though informative, 
are static in nature.  Importantly, it can be shown that stages of migration diffusion can imply 
that the impacts of migration (and remittances) on income inequality can change over time. In 
the next section, I use an example to highlight the limitation of the static analysis. 
2.4.3 Some insight from the migration diffusion theory8 
A simple example is offered to clarify the migration diffusion hypothesis. Consider a 
population with two types of income sources, that is remittance (   )   and non-
remittances (    ) either of which can be influenced by household migration  ( )  Total 
household income would be  
                                                 
8 Following a comment by one examiner, I included section 2.4.3 in the thesis to illustrate limitations of the gini 
index decomposition in analysis a relationship that could be dynamic. 
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 ( )    ( )      ( )      (2-10) 
Using the definition of Gini coefficient of total income in equation 2.7 above, we have  
 ( )                        (2-11) 
 
where , as before,    is share of component k in total income;      is  Gini coefficient 
corresponding to income source    and      is a correlation of income from source  to total 
distribution of income. In this instance, the set of income is defined for    *    + 
The simple decomposition in equation 2.11 demonstrates that it is important to explicitly 
consider the indirect effects of migration on other income non remittance sources. Indeed, the 
first term could be positive or negative, depending on how migration and remittances affect 
other income sources. If the second term in the decomposition equation above is positive over 
some range of M, then even if the direct remittance effect is equalising, migration could 
increase inequality in migrant-source areas. 
2.5 Poverty impacts and effectiveness of remittances 
This section presents poverty estimates for rural and African/Black households according to 
the 1995 and 2000 IES data. I first present the poverty headcount and gap computed on per 
capita income with and without remittances. A discussion of the contribution of various 
income sources to poverty reduction follows before delving into the effectiveness of each 
income source.  
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2.5.1 Poverty headcount and gap 
One uncomplicated method of examining the impact of different sources of income is to run a 
simulation of an income change and examine its attendant effect on the poverty index Taylor et 
al. (2005). This kind of approach assumes an exogenous cessation of remittance flows, which 
in turn affects total income, while all other income components remain unchanged. Clearly, 
households without remittance income are not affected. 
I use this naive approach as a baseline and present in Table 2.4  below poverty estimates from 
the   national and rural samples for both 1995 and 2000. Overall, an increase in remittances is 
associated with a decline in both proportion and depth of poverty. When income from 
remittances is ignored, poverty increases in all cases. For instance, headcount poverty increases 
by 3 percent in the absence of remittances in 2000 while the poverty gap increases by 6 percent 
nationally and 8 percent in the case of rural households. 
In 1995, however, if remittances are ignored the poverty headcount increases by 1 percentage, 
while the poverty depth would have fallen by 5 percent nationally, and by the same margin 
when rural households are considered separately. 
Generally stated, remittances appear to have a limited role in reducing the absolute numbers of 
the poor in South Africa, but are more effective in alleviating the depth and severity of 
poverty. This result accords with that of Adams (2004) who found that the ameliorative effect 
of remittance income is greater in terms of lessening dire poverty than it was in lifting 
households out of poverty in Guatemala. It is also notable however that the effects were 
generally stronger in 1995 than they were in 2000. This observation is possibly driven by the 
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fact that the 2000 sample recorded more households with incomes below the poverty line and 
with remittances as part of their total income. 
Table 2.4:  FGT Index for black African households 
 1995 2000 
 National Rural National Rural 
Poverty headcount     
























Poverty gap     
























Source: Author‟s calculations using IES (1995, 2000) 
 
2.5.2 Disaggregating poverty headcount and deficit by income source 
I report in Table 2.5 below both the absolute and relative contributions of various income 
sources to poverty alleviation. For both the 1995 and 2000 samples, I use two poverty lines to 
compare the effects of income sources at those two poverty levels. 
Looking at the 1995 results, wages contribute a relative share of 63 percent to the reduction in 
headcount poverty while remittances and social pension contribute 4.5 percent and 7.4 
percent, respectively, all when considered at the poverty line of R322 per capita per month. 
However, at the lower poverty line (of R174 per person per month), wages contribute about 55 
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percent while remittances and social pension contribute 7.4 percent and 10.9 percent 
respectively. Clearly,  the increase in contribution of remittances and pensions point to the 
possibility that these incomes accrue to households that are more indigent and vulnerable than 
does the wage income. 
In similar analysis, the 2000 estimates also show that wages contribute a share of 60.8 percent 
at the higher PL and only 48.5 percent at the lower PL, while remittances increase their 
contribution from 8 percent to 13 percent and social pensions from 10 percent to 16 percent.  
Notable, private pensions, other social grants and capital income do not register any significant 
changes at the different poverty lines. 
The overall poverty gap shrinks from 0.36 in both 1995 and 2000, to 0.17 in 1995 and to 0.19 
in 2000. The largest share of this shrinkage is due to wages as before. The shares for wages, 
capital and private pension decline along with the poverty line in both 1995 and 2000, while 
the shares for remittances, social pension and other grants increase at the lower power poverty 
lines. 
In sum, while wage incomes are responsible for the largest share of poverty reduction, 
remittances and social grants appear to have an increasing effect on poverty reduction when 





Table 2.5:  Contribution of income sources to poverty alleviation among rural African 
households 
 PL=3894 PL=2088 
 FGT (α=0) FGT (α=1) FGT (α=0) FGT (α=1) 
1995 Contribution Contribution Contribution contribution 
Income source Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative  
Wages 0.194 0.630 0.310 0.486 0.306 0.547 0.365 0.442 
Capital 0.014 0.046 0.024 0.037 0.024 0.042 0.029 0.035 
Private 
pension 
0.005 0.018 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.013 0.016 
Social 
pension 
0.023 0.074 0.087 0.137 0.060 0.109 0.130 0.157 
Grants 0.004 0.013 0.016 0.025 0.012 0.021 0.024 0.029 
Remittances 0.014 0.045 0.059 0.093 0.041 0.074 0.088 0.106 
Other 0.053 0.17 0.131 0.205 0.106 0.189 0.178 0.215 
FGT 0.69 0.36 0.44 0.17 
         
2000         
















Wages 0.205 0.608 0.281 0.442 0.277 0.485 0.319 0.394 
Capital 0.017 0.051 0.033 0.052 0.031 0.054 0.042 0.052 
Private 
pension 
0.003 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.011 
Social 
pension 
0.035 0.103 0.109 0.171 0.096 0.168 0.153 0.189 
Grants 0.006 0.018 0.020 0.032 0.015 0.027 0.029 0.036 
Remittances 0.027 0.081 0.100 0.157 0.076 0.133 0.145 0.180 
Other 0.044 0.129 0.086 0.135 0.071 0.124 0.112 0.138 
FGT 0.66 0.36 0.42 0.19 





2.5.3 Poverty effectiveness of remittances 
The relative effectiveness of the various income sources in reducing poverty is presented by G 
(0) and G (1) poverty headcount and poverty gap. For both 1995 and 2000, remittances are not 
as effective as wages and social pension, but do better than disability and child grants in 
reducing both the poverty headcount and the severity of poverty. In other words, the 
opportunity cost of spending a rand in any given income source is highest for wages, followed 
by social pension. Remittances have a lesser opportunity cost, but still greater than child and 
disability grants. 
According to table 2.7, market incomes (wages, private pension, capital) are more effective, in 
general, than the social pension and remittances in reducing headcount poverty. Other grants 
come in the middle in terms of their effectiveness. However, the market incomes are less 
effective than the social and private transfers in reducing the poverty gap.  In general, social 
transfers are not designed, on their own, to bring people out of poverty. That is, the amount 
that is given as a social transfer is often far less than what an individual would receive as 
market income, on average. Similarly, private transfers are often a proportion of market 
income. Therefore, they will not reduce headcount poverty as much as market income. 
Arguably, therefore, the headcount-based gamma can fail to assess properly the achievement 
of poverty objectives. 
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2.6 Redistributive impacts of remittances 
2.6.1 Lorenz Curves  
In order to demonstrate the direct impact of remittances on income distribution, I plot Lorenz 
curves for log of per capita income, including and excluding per capita remittances.  The curve 
plots various percentiles of the households in question as a function of the proportion of 
income that they receive.  Figure 2.2 below contains two panels, one depicting the 1995 
Lorenz curve while the other displays the curve for 2000.  
For perfectly equally distributed income, the Lorenz curve runs diagonally from the origin. In 
contrast, if all income is held by one individual, the curve would run along the horizontal axis 
and only turn perpendicularly at the 100th percentile. Any shift to the right, therefore represents 
a reduction income inequality, and the converse is also true.  In the present case below, the 
dashed line lies entirely below and to the right of the solid curve, meaning that income 
distribution is more equal in the no-remittance scenario as opposed to a scenario where 




Figure 2.2: Income Lorenz Curve for Rural African Households (1995, 2000) 
 
Succinctly stated, the inflow of remittances unambiguously reduces income inequality among 
rural Black South Africans. 
2.6.2 Gini index decomposition by income source  
The diagrammatic presentation in the previous subsection (above) can be augmented by 
estimating the extent to which remittances and other income sources contribute to income 
inequality. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 below show estimations of the Gini inequality index and its 
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subsample, in the top and lower panels, respectively. In both sets of tables, the respective 
columns from left to right represent  shares of total income (  ),  income source Gini (  ), 
correlation between income source and total income (  ),  the share of inequality contributed 
by the income source and the source‟s marginal effect on inequality (% change).  
 
Table 2.6: Gini Decomposition by Income Source, African households (1995) 
Source Sk Gk Rk Share % Change 
All African households 
     Wages 0.632 0.719 0.898 0.717 0.085 
Capital 0.065 0.981 0.755 0.084 0.019 
priv_pension 0.012 0.987 0.42 0.009 -0.003 
social_pension 0.057 0.851 -0.036 -0.003 -0.06 
Grants 0.015 0.965 0.083 0.002 -0.013 
Remittances 0.042 0.916 0.107 0.007 -0.035 




   
      Rural African households 
     Wages 0.553 0.744 0.868 0.66 0.107 
Capital 0.061 0.984 0.778 0.087 0.026 
priv_pension 0.013 0.987 0.46 0.011 -0.002 
social_pension 0.087 0.831 0.087 0.012 -0.075 
Grants 0.017 0.965 0.128 0.004 -0.013 
Remittances 0.062 0.897 0.141 0.015 -0.048 














Table 2.7: Gini decomposition by income source, African households (2000) 
Source Sk Gk Rk Share % Change 
All African 
    Wages 0.71 0.762 0.928 0.809 0.099 
Capital 0.048 0.971 0.609 0.046 -0.002 
priv_pension 0.011 0.995 0.681 0.012 0.001 
social_pension 0.046 0.886 0.026 0.002 -0.044 
Grants 0.015 0.964 0.154 0.004 -0.011 
Remittances 0.059 0.895 0.235 0.02 -0.039 
Other 0.111 0.866 0.696 0.108 -0.003 
Total income 0.621 
   
      Rural African  
    Wages 0.633 0.806 0.917 0.764 0.131 
Capital 0.047 0.969 0.599 0.045 -0.002 
priv_pension 0.008 0.994 0.586 0.008 0 
social_pension 0.084 0.854 0.203 0.024 -0.061 
Grants 0.019 0.964 0.249 0.007 -0.011 
Remittances 0.078 0.844 0.152 0.016 -0.062 
Other 0.131 0.859 0.741 0.136 0.005 
Total income 0.612 
   Source: author‟s computation using IES (2000) 
 
 
The immediate impact of remittances is to reduce income inequality.  For any given change in 
the amount of rand received as remittance, income inequality is reduced by a larger margin in 
rural areas than it is in urban areas. Specifically, as shown in table 2.6 and 2.7, a 10 percent 
increase in remittances is associated with a 0.4 percent decrease in the Gini coefficient (for all 
black households) while the same takes away between 0.5 and 0.6 percent from the Gini index 
when only rural African households are considered.  
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Turning to other income sources, state transfers in the form of old age pension and other 
grants also reduce income inequality. However, the impact of other grants is smaller than that 
of old age pensions and appears uniform in magnitude in rural and urban areas. Old age 
pensions, much like remittances, have a stronger impact on income inequality in rural areas. In 
contrast, labour incomes consistently worsen income inequality, both in urban and rural areas, 
with a larger effect though among rural households. The smaller income sources, private 
pensions and capital income, appear inconsistent in their impact, improving inequality in some 
instance and worsening income distribution in another. In sum, our Gini decomposition 
analysis makes a clear suggestion that remittances militate against income inequality among 
Black households in South Africa. 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter set out to investigate how remittance incomes are linked to poverty and income 
inequality. The analysis employed decomposition techniques of both the Gini inequality 
coefficient and the FGT poverty index. The patterns of remittance receipt indicate that 
remittance activity is more widespread among African/Black people than other racial groups 
and the share of remittance receiving households is larger among rural households when 
compared with their urban counterparts. 
 Focusing on Black households, the chapter finds remittances are positively associated with 
lower poverty levels and to some extent, a more equitable income distribution. While 
remittances are only a marginal income source in the overall household distribution of income, 
they make a significant income contribution to the poor.  
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These descriptive results point to the significance of remittances and related issues such as 
internal migration issues in the design of development and poverty reduction strategies. In 
order to go beyond these findings and perform actual policy recommendations, it is essential to 
take into account possible behavioural interactions and responses, including the processes of 
migration and labour participation as well as the various social programs that may affect 





3  Estimating the Impact of  Migration on Household Welfare 
3.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I focused on the contribution of remittances and other household 
income sources to poverty alleviation and income disparities. Using decompositions of poverty 
indices, I demonstrated that remittances are an important source of income for indigent 
households in rural South Africa. The inflow of remittances, however, often follows the 
outmigration of some household members. The combined effect of these two processes -
outmigration and remittance inflow- may trigger changes in household production and 
economic choices such as labour force participation on the part of those who remain. As such, 
the welfare impact of such dynamics would not be accounted for in the descriptive analysis of 
the last chapter. 
An important methodological issue emerges in attempting to measure the household welfare 
effects of migration and remittances. Specifically, the set of remittance households is not likely 
to be a random selection from the wider population (Barham and Boucher, 1998; Acosta et al, 
2007). Arguably, this emanates from self-selection by economic migrants. The literature on 
internal and international migration has long insisted on the selectivity of migrants. Both 
migration theory and existing empirical evidence emphasize the unique features of migration 
and migrants compared to other processes in, and members of, society. Theoretical predictions 
posit the possibility of self-selection, particularly in the international context, where inequalities 
are more prevalent in origin than in destination economies (Borjas, 1987; Borjas, Bronars and 
51 
 
Trejo, 1992). Existing literature on migration suggests that migrants self-select, in terms of 
observable characteristics such as education attainment and skills (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2006; 
McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006). Recent evidence on internal migration in South Africa 
suggests the prevalence of positive selection among migrants from rural areas (Naidoo, 
Leibbrandt, & Dorrington, Magnitudes, Personal Characteristics and Activities of Eastern 
Cape Migrants: A Comparison with Other Migrants and with Non-Migrants using Data form 
the 1996 and 2001 Censuses, 2008). Hence, there is need for careful methodological attention 
when estimating the welfare effects of remittances. 
Failure to account for the potential selectivity bias and the possibility of endogeneity of 
migration and remittances in the household welfare model can yield biased estimates. In the 
present chapter, I recognise the possibility that migration of household members and the 
subsequent inflow of remittances could be an integral part of a household‟s livelihood strategy. 
Accordingly, I attempt to model the impact of migration and remittances on household 
welfare taking into account the possible endogeneity of these factors. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds in six further sections. Section 3.2 reviews relevant literature 
on migration remittances and household welfare. I discuss various methodological issues and 
options in section 3.3, before presenting a chosen empirical strategy in section 3.4. Section 3.5 
introduces the data and discusses summary statistics pertaining to a chosen sample. In section 
3.6, I discuss estimated results and conclude the chapter in section 3.7.  
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3.2 Related Literature  
3.2.1 A theoretical overview of migration and poverty linkages 
Research on migration is relatively large, with pioneering work going back to the contributions 
of Sjaastad (1962) and most remarkably, the seminal works of Todaro (1969) and Harris and 
Todaro (1970). As discussed in Chapter 1, according to the Todaro model, migration takes 
place from rural areas to urban areas, driven essentially by relatively higher expected earnings 
in the urban sector. Thus, the model operates as a cost-benefit process, which persists until the 
net expected gain for the migrant goes to zero. This conceptualisation focuses on the welfare 
of the migrants who individually decides to migrate for their personal benefits. 
Notwithstanding its strengths, the model‟s focus on the individual has drawn a fair amount of 
criticism, mostly by authors who argue instead that migration can better be explained as a 
collective household decision that can serve to minimise risks in the face of uncertainty and 
many market failures prevalent in developing countries (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1991).  
This critique, often termed the new economics of labour migration, attempts to recast the 
Todaro class of models in a collective household decision making paradigm. 
A related, but separate, body of literature is dedicated specifically to the economics of 
remittances. Like the migration literature, this body of literature focuses on competing theories 
of motives for remittances. The unsettled debate rages among the competing hypotheses of 
altruism hypothesis, asset accumulation and, risk sharing and co-insurance (Lucas and Stark, 
1985; Poirine, 1997; Gubert, 2002; Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). The literature has tried to 
garner evidence on these competing motives as well as on the drivers for migration, but most 
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such studies have tended to focus on wage differentials so as to test the competing theories of 
remittances.   
Indeed much attention, both theoretical and empirical, has been paid to the issues surrounding 
the causes of internal migration and motives for remitting. However, knowledge gaps remain 
on the consequences of migration including the economic linkages between migration and 
their original households. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in remittance flows 
and their impacts on migrant sending economies, mainly in developing countries (World Bank, 
2006). The international literature is now awash with studies on the consequences of labour 
migration on the welfare of both the migrants and their original countries and communities. A 
disproportionate bias, however, seems to favour international migration and case studies of 
Latin American countries.  Ironically though, the largest flows of people take place within 
country borders and, not necessarily from villages to cities, but from economically lagging to 
leading rural areas (World Bank, 2009).  Furthermore, the sub-Saharan African region, which 
hosts masses of poverty-stricken citizens, has the received much less attention as far as internal 
labour migration and domestic remittances are concerned.  
In theory, the poverty impacts of (migration-related) remittances in migrant sending 
households and communities could be located between two possible extremes (Taylor et al. 
2005; de Haas, 2010). One end of the spectrum features the optimistic scenario in which 
migration reduces poverty in migrant-source areas by shifting population from the low-income 
rural sector to the relatively high-income urban economy. Income remittances then contribute 
to incomes of households in the migrant-source areas, necessarily increasing household 
welfare. The other extreme describes a „pessimistic‟ scenario where poor households face 
liquidity and risk constraints that limit their access to migrant labour markets. This scenario is 
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posited particularly for international migration but would hold in any scenario in which 
migration entails high transportation and entry costs. Households and individuals participating 
in migration may benefit, but these beneficiaries of migration may not include the rural poor. 
If migration is costly and risky, at least initially, migrants are likely to come from the middle or 
upper segments of the source-areas‟ income distribution, not from the poorest households.  
The empirical literature, tends to side with the optimistic scenario in that it portrays a generally 
rosy picture in favour of the poverty reducing effects of remittances in recipient countries or 
communities. Indeed, the findings for a number of country-based studies seem to show that 
migration and remittances have a positive effect on the earnings of the individuals and 
households who participate in migration (Adams, 1989; 2006; Adams and Page, 2005; Barham 
and Boucher, 1998; Rodriguez, 1998; Yang and Martinez, 2006). The estimated effect however, 
differs in strength from country to country. In a few cases though, it was found that 
remittances did not sufficiently offset losses from migration such that the overall effect was to 
increase poverty (Acosta et al., 2007). 
The context under which migration takes place is thus important in determining poverty 
impacts. Several perspectives can be identified from the literature in this regard.  At one level, 
differences in type of migration, typically domestic or international, can determine the 
magnitude of poverty reduction. Lokshin et al (2007) for instance show that international 
remittances are larger than domestic remittances in Nepal and, to this extent, are perceived to 
have a greater effect in reducing poverty.  
A few studies use a cross section of countries to unveil the remittance impacts on poverty 
from an international perspective. For instance, Adams and Page (2005) show that remittances 
have a strong poverty reducing effect after analysing evidence from a pooled sample of 74 low 
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and middle income countries. However, this unanimous finding is challenged by Acosta, 
Calderon, Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007) who find mixed results for a sample of 12 Latin 
American countries, after examining each country‟s evidence separately.  The difference in 
findings demonstrates the importance in considering the heterogeneity of different country 
experiences when analysing the migration and remittance impact. 
The bulk of the literature on remittances and poverty focuses on Latin American countries, 
where labour, and not necessarily the poorest people, migrates to the United States and Canada 
for better employment opportunities. The large amounts of remittances that these migrants 
send to their original countries seem to attract a lot of attention.  Less attention is paid to poor 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa, where a large volume of migration happens within countries, 
mainly from rural to urban (or peri-urban) areas.     
3.2.2 Evidence from South Africa 
The impacts of migration and remittances remain understudied in the South African literature, 
possibly due to lack of appropriate data. In one study, based on a panel dataset from the 
KwaZulu Natal province, Klaasen and Woolard (2006) show that changes in  remittance flows 
are among the important factors responsible for both entry into and exit from poverty at the 
household level. The study uses income mobility transition matrices and thus, does not 
account for the possibility of endogeneity of remittances and migration in the household‟s 
income vector.  Using several cross section surveys, Posel and Casale (2006) find some 
descriptive evidence that migration has been effective in lifting households out of poverty in 
the post 1994 decade. In addition, Posel and Casale report that migrant households are 
significantly poorer than non-migrant households and that the gap between the two household 
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types seems to be widening. When compared with social welfare payments, private transfers 
have been shown to be more effective in influencing household expenditure and reducing 
poverty (Maitra and Ray, 2003).  
While, on the one hand, a rosy picture portrayed of the impacts of migration on household 
poverty, it has been noted, on the other hand, that poverty may also constrain migration in 
South Africa. Specifically, it is argued that costs and risks of migration may prevent or delay 
potential migrants from moving to urban or other areas which are perceived to have better 
economic opportunities (Gelderbloom, 2007). This view is corroborated by empirical evidence, 
albeit from a different angle, that suggests that old age pensions may have influenced the 
outflow of prime age household members to look for employment elsewhere (Case and 
Ardington, 2007). Stated differently, it is likely that prime age individual fail to migrate due to 
unavailability of funds or absence of adults who would take care of their children if they 
migrated. 
In a nutshell, these few studies generally seem to indicate that migration and remittances 
alleviate household poverty. However, it is not known whether the same results would obtain 
if more rigorous econometric methods were used to estimate the poverty outcome.  The 
present study therefore attempts to fill this gap by using treatment effect models to estimating 
welfare outcomes of migration and remittances. 
3.3 An overview of methodological issues 
Although the notion that migration contributes positively to household livelihoods appears to 
have become a stylised fact, a major challenge remains in assessing the extent of such benefits. 
In order to assess such benefits, it is essential to observe households in two different states, at 
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least. That is, before the household sends a migrant and after a migrant has left.  Such an 
analysis necessarily requires longitudinal data. However, these panel data remain scarce, 
particularly in developing countries, and therefore the appropriate assessments remain 
infeasible.  
Consequently, the researcher armed with cross section data, has to resort to counterfactual 
analysis in order to infer the magnitudes of those outcomes (Ravallion, 2005). Counterfactual 
analysis attempts to addresses the challenge by estimating potential outcomes under non-
participation scenarios. In considering the appropriate counterfactual, an unsettled empirical 
debate persists on whether the benefits and costs of migration accrue to treated individuals 
only or their household and community as well.  For example, Posel (2001) argues that 
remittances are directed at specific individuals, rather than at entire households, implying that 
an impact analysis should focus on the same individuals.  Azam and Gubert (2003), on the 
other hand, assert the contrary in their cross country study of African countries. Using multi-
country evidence, they demonstrate that remittances are often directed at households rather 
than at individual household members. In this study, I follow Azam and Gubert in focussing 
on household impacts.  Indeed, this seems appropriate since the main aim is to analyse poverty 
impacts, which are often measured at the household level.  Further, the collective approach has 
become firmly embedded in the new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985), 
where migration has increasingly been modelled as the outcome of a joint utility maximisation 
made by the erstwhile migrants and their family, household or community members (Ghatak, 
Levine and Price, 1996; Poirine, 1997).  
A further issue pertains to the two–way causation running between migration and household 
welfare. A number of studies apply Rubin‟s Causal model as a framework for estimating the 
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treatment effect of migration on household welfare and other outcomes (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2008). An important ingredient in this framework is the potential outcomes 
specification, which defines realised and counterfactual outcomes of a treatment process.  In 
turn, conditional probabilities of receiving the treatment as a function of potential outcomes 
and observed covariates have to be specified. This “assignment mechanism” can range from 
(completely) randomised experiments to non-experimental methods which have dependence 
on the potential outcomes. 
3.3.1 Experimental methods 
Randomised experiments provide the first best answer to the assignment problem because 
they ensure that the potential earnings of migrant households, if they had not migrated, are 
well represented by the randomly selected control group. Causal effects are then estimated by 
comparing the average outcome of interest for the two groups. Gibson, McKenzie and 
Skillman (2006, 2009) exploit randomisation provided by a procedure in the New Zealand 
immigration policy on Tongan migrants, using lotteries to allocate migration permits, to 
compare the outcomes for remaining household members with those for members of similar 
households that were unsuccessful in the ballots.  
However, the use of experiments in migration studies is still scarce. Indeed, social experiments 
have been conducted at various times, but they have not necessarily been the sole method for 
establishing causality. In fact, they have been regarded with some level of suspicion concerning 
the relevance of the results for policy purposes. According to Imbens and Wooldridge(2008), 
this scepticism may be due, in part, to the fact that it is generally not possible in Economics to 
do blind (or double blind) tests, which would create the possibility of placebo effects that 
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compromise the external validity of the estimates. Consequently, observed data from surveys 
therefore remains more commonly used. 
3.3.2 Non-experimental methods 
A number of statistical techniques have been developed to estimate migration impacts using 
longitudinal or cross sectional data. Using the former - panel data- is  advantageous in 
identifying migration and remittance impacts essentially because the researcher can  allow for 
control of time-invariant unobservable factors.  When the panel includes a migrant sample 
only, a single difference estimator can compare post with to pre-migration outcomes and take 
the average difference as the mean impact of migration. On the other hand, when the panel 
(data set) includes both migrants and non-migrants, a difference in difference estimator can be 
used to directly estimate changes attributable to migration. Notably, the same analysis can be 
done using cross sectional data with retrospective variables (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007; 
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). However, large sample panel data remain scarce in developing 
countries,  which explains why  the majority of studies  rely on cross sectional data to estimate 
counterfactual outcomes that would have obtained had the decision to participate in migration 
not been taken.   
Adams (1989) introduces the migration-poverty strand of the literature in his empirical study 
of rural Egyptian households. In essence, Adams estimates a regression of earnings for non-
migrants and then uses the estimated parameters to predict expected earnings for migrants. 
While the procedure appears solid enough when considered at the level of individual workers, 
it becomes more complicated when the aim is to estimate household earnings. For instance, 
one needs to account for changes in household size and behavioural impacts resulting from 
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the assumed return of the migrant household member. This is the essence of the method 
introduced by Rodriguez (1998) in his estimation of a household income equation for 
Philippine households. In addition to the usual household characteristics, Rodriguez 
introduces other  variables (such as the number of adults and migrants) on the right hand side 
of his linear model to account for the likelihood that migrants would contribute more (or less 
income) to the household. It is important to note, however, that both studies treat migrant 
households as a non-random sample of the population. In addition, the feasibility of this 
approach depends on the availability of demographic and labour market information 
pertaining to the migrants. 
As alluded to in the preceding sections, self-selection into migration could imply that earnings 
estimates derived from these procedures are wrong.  In order to alleviate this problem, the 
sample-selection model introduced by Heckman (1979) is often employed. In essence, the 
procedure involves estimation of an earnings function as well as one or more selection 
equations. Barham and Boucher (1998) for instance impose a specific probability distribution 
structure on their model which explicitly incorporates two selection rules. The first rule is a 
migration decision equation which accounts for differences between the two sub-samples that 
is migrants and non-migrants. Because their geographical area of study has low labour force 
participation rates, the authors also include a second rule to account for labour force 
participation. However, as pointed out by Deaton (1997), a drawback of this approach is that 
results are potentially compromised by biases in the counterfactual estimators given the strong 
distributional assumptions of the Heckman self-selection model.   
In recent times, matching techniques have gained popularity as a method of estimating 
treatment effects (Imbens, 2004).  Under matching methods, the objective is to assess the 
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causal effect of a treatment (for example, migration) on a particular outcome experienced by 
those affected by the treatment, after correcting for non-random selection of participants 
(Ravallion, 2005). In the spirit of regression methods, the source of bias under matching 
methods is to be found in covariates. However, the two methods differ in that (unlike 
regression) treatment effects are constructed by matching individuals with the same 
characteristics.   
The use of matching estimators to correct for self-selection relies on the assumption that there 
exists a set of observable conditioning variables for which the non-migration outcome is 
independent of the migration status. Stated differently, matching  assumes that there is a set of 
observables conditioning variables that capture all the relevant differences between the treated 
and the control groups so that the non-treatment outcome is independent of treatment status, 
conditional on those characteristics (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Notably, this is a potential 
limitation of extending the matching methodology to estimate migrants counterfactual income, 
for it is conceivable that unobservable characteristics, such as an entrepreneurial nature of 
household members, could be correlated with the migration decision. 
3.3.3 Way forward 
As noted in the preceding paragraphs, there are a number of methods that can be used to 
estimate the joint impact of migration and remittances on household welfare outcomes. While 
experimental methods are not often practicable due to unavailability of experimental data, each 
of the alternative methods also comes with its own advantages and weaknesses. To this end, 
the nature of available data often drives the researcher‟s choice of methodology. In the next 
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section, I discuss a simple analytical framework that I later use to estimate the poverty effects 
of migration and remittances. 
3.4 Estimation strategy 
3.4.1 Econometric framework 
The empirical strategy used in this chapter is based on instrumental variable methods (see 
Wooldridge, 2002).  The basic structure includes an outcome and treatment equation, specified 
respectively as  
 (          )   (       )  (3-1) 
 
  (            )   (       )   (3-2) 
 
where the outcome of primary interest (  ) is explained by a linear combination of factors in  
equation 3.1. Among the explanatory variables in equation (3.1) is an indicator variable    
which gives an indication of whether the dependent variable is observed or not. Further,    
and    are vectors of exogenous variables, while             are vectors of unknown 
coefficients. 
Under parametric estimation, the method has been applied in endogenous treatment effects 
models (Madalla, 1983; Vella, 1998; Vella and Verbeek, 1999a) to estimate the impact of binary 
endogenous variables on a continuous outcome variable.  
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3.4.2 Specifying household expenditure model with sample selection 
According to the new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1988), 
migration decisions are made by and involve entire (migrant-sending) households rather than 
by individual migrants themselves only. As such, the migrant sending household‟s welfare 
function is likely to be driven by factors including the household‟s participation in migration, 
which in turn also relates to subsequent remittance flows. Following this perspective, the unit 
of analysis (       ) in equations 3.1 and 3.2 is the household. 
Since some households take part in migration while others do not, I treat migration as a 
categorical variable of binary9 type.  To formalise ideas, I define a log per capita expenditure 
equation (that accounts for household migration status) 
      
                  (3-3) 
 
where     is the log of per capita household expenditure. The vector   
   contains variables that 
predict household welfare while the indicator variable     shows whether the household 
participates in migration. This binary choice is modelled as an outcome of a latent variable, 
  
 . By assumption,    
  is a linear outcome of the covariates    and a residual term      
Specifically  
   
                   (3-4)  
 
                                                 
9 In more detailed models migration choice may be categorized by, inter alia, specific 
destination, reason for and duration of migration. For instance, Adams (2006) compares 
domestic migrants (within Ghana) with international migrants and non-migrants 
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where   
  are predictors of the household decision to participate in migration. By definition,  
  
is not observable but can be determined from data observations in terms of which households 
participated in migration and which ones did not. The decision to participate in migration is 
made according to the rule which says that  
     {
             
               
       (3-5) 
 
The variables in   may overlap with     but it is assumed that at least one element of  , 
denoted as   , is a unique and significant determinant of   .  That is, there is at least one 
independent source of variation in   . I return to a discussion on the choice of instrumental 
variables    in section 3.4.4 below. 
3.4.3 Estimation Issues and Procedure 
Apart from the sample selection problem, which is corrected by using the selection equation, 
there may also be feedback effects between (participation in) migration and household welfare 
(in equation 3.3). In other words, migration and other variables may be endogenous, and hence 
correlated with the error term. The presence of endogenous variables would generally yield 
inconsistent estimates if ordinary least squared (OLS) estimation is employed of   over the 
subsample corresponding to        due to the correlation between    and    operating 
through the relationship between    and    (Vella, 1998). It is difficult to find variables that are 
truly exogenous in the migration and expenditure equations (Adams, Cuecuecha and Page, 
2008; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010). 
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A number of remedies exist, though. First, the two stage least squares approach which 
essentially eliminates the nonzero expectation between     and    . Second the ML method 
which relies heavily on the distributional assumption regarding the two error terms. However, 
for continuous outcomes of interest, the 2SLS involves a substantial loss of efficiency when 
compared with treatment effects models estimated using full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) (Dimova and Wolff, 2008; Deb and Seck, 2009).  The analysis of this chapter uses 
treatment effects model (which is) estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
In a nutshell, the Maximum Likelihood method requires the assumption that the error terms 
(     ) are independently and identically distributed as  (   )  where 
  [
  
    
     
 ]        (3-6) 
 
and       may also be written as     . The log likelihood function for the specified model is 
given in Madalla (1983). For observation j, the parameters of the model can be estimated by 
maximising the log likelihood function   
    = {
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  (3-7) 
 
 
The estimation algorithm (see Adams, Cuecuecha and Page, 2008) involves two steps. In the 
first step, a logit model is estimated taking into account sample selection. In the second step, 
the expenditure equation is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood. 
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3.4.4 Variable selection and exclusion restrictions 
In the development literature, economists have relied on money metric measures of utility – 
income and consumption expenditure – as the preferred indicators of poverty and living 
standards. Income is generally a measure of choice on developed countries while consumption 
expenditure emerges as the preferred metric in developing countries (Sahn and Stifel, 2003). 
The choice of expenditures over income is often dictated by a number of challenges involved 
in measuring income in developing countries, including seasonal variability in such earnings 
and the large shares of income that come from self-employment. The sample used in this study 
comes from rural South Africa, which has generally lower living standards. It seems prudent, 
therefore, to employ per capita expenditure as an indicator of welfare. 
Various sets of determinants of household welfare have been used in the literature. A key 
challenge involves the choice of appropriate specification of the aggregate model in addition to 
selecting predictors of household wellbeing. Essentially, the model should include human 
capital characteristics and factors that affect household production as well as attributes that 
relate to location of household (Lokshin et al, 2007). The former includes household 
demographics, education and ethnicity, among others, while the latter mainly includes region-
specific variables for the migrant sending household. 
Because household heads are often the main income earner, a number of attributes pertaining 
to their human capital characteristics are included to represent the households‟ earning 
capacity. Ordinarily, the head‟s education attainment, age and gender are used as predictors of 
household income. In households with more than one income earner, it is possible that the 
head‟s education level could misrepresent the households‟ earning capacity.  For example , a 
recent study of Ghanaian households (Joliffe, 2002) finds that maximum and average 
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education attainment of  working age adults in the household perform better in comparison 
with either  the head‟s or the minimum education attainment (among prime-age members) as 
household income predictors. In light of this, I experiment with the standard representation of 
household education against the average education attainment of working age members, given 
the available data.  
The gender dimension of poverty is quite well known (Lanjouw and Ravalion, 1995; Gruen, 
2004). A number of factors play a role in determining the disproportionate representation of 
women headed households in poverty. For instance, women on average earn less than their 
male counterparts. By extension, female-headed households are more likely to have lower 
earnings than male headed households. Hence, a gender (and marital status) indicator factors 
out the contribution of gender to differences in household earnings.  
Apart from the gender factor, it has been shown that poverty is generally more prevalent in 
larger households (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995), and often positively associated with higher 
family dependency ratios. I include in the model variables representing the number (or 
proportion) of people in the household that are below the age of seven, representing infant 
dependency and between 7 and 18 to capture child dependency.  
In the remittance equation, I include the same set of variables as those explaining per capita 
expenditure, in addition to the exclusion restrictions. The rationale for including these 
variables follows standard literature on migration and remittances. The standard human capital 
model (Becker, 1993) stipulates that human capital variables are likely to affect migration 
because more educated people enjoy greater employment and expected income earning 
possibilities in destination areas.  In the literature, household characteristics are also 
hypothesised to affect the chances of migration and remittance receipt. In particular, some 
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authors have suggested that migration is a life cycle event in which households with older 
heads, more working age males and fewer children are more likely to participate. 
3.4.5 Identifying the per capita expenditure model 
The specified per capita expenditure model above is identifiable if there is at least one variable in 
the migration/remittance equation that uniquely and non-trivially predicts migration, but is 
independent of household income. Formally, a valid instrument would be one that is highly 
correlated with the household‟s propensity to participate in migration and affects expenditure 
only through receipt of the remittance. 
Different instruments have been used to identify household participation in migration. 
Previous migration research finds that social networks are an important driver of migration 
decisions (Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 1996; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007).  
Arguably, such networks serve to lower the costs of migration for rural people by providing 
information about job opportunities, helping potential migrants secure employment as well as 
supplying credit to cover reallocation expenses, and ameliorating settling costs upon arrival.   
Munshi (2003) tests the role of networks in promoting migration and finds a greater propensity 
toward migration in villages with existing migrants. Munshi‟s result could be understood to 
mean that there is significant propensity for new migrants to follow in the footsteps of existing 
migrants. 
 
There seems to be no standard metric for migration networks, but a number of direct and 
indirect factors have been considered. For instance, one direct measure is achieved by simply 
counting the number or proportion of migrant households in a geographical locality, in 
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essence the strategy used by Lokshin et al (2010) in their study of Bulgarian migration. 
However, in cases where information on migration is very limited, the prevalence of migration 
networks could also be determined by other proxies of association. For instance, Adams et al 
(2008) use ethnicity and religious affiliation to represent social networks in Ghana. Acosta et al 
(2007) decipher migration incidence from remittance flows and use the distribution of 
remittances in a defined area (e.g. ward or district) as a useful proxy for the extent of social 
networks. The direction of flow of remittances can also be a useful indicator. That is, if 
remittances mostly flow from parents to children, then the presence of living parents to 
members of a household can be used to as a predictor of remittance receipt (Dimova and 
Wolff, 2008). Deb and Seck (2009) use the distance to major urban centres as an identifying 
restriction of their migration equation. This variable, though attractive, may not offer a useful 
choice if internal migration is not dominated by the rural-urban stream. 
   
Exclusion restrictions thus vary from one specific study to another, and depending on the 
availability of particular information in the data set. In this chapter, I experiment with a 
number of instruments. Firstly, following Acosta et al  (2007), the distribution of remittances in 
a district seems a plausible option. I also include province and language dummies to reflect the 
ethnicity and bias due to political history of South Africa. In addition, I experiment with a 
variable indicating the presence of a pensioner in a household. The rationale behind this 
variable is that rural households with older heads are more likely to have the capability and 
means of sending away their younger members out as migrant labour.  There is growing 
evidence that the arrival of pension in a household affect labour migration among prime aged 
individuals (Ardington, Case and Hosegood, 2009).  This is explained in at least two ways: 
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firstly, pension funds finance migration activity and secondly, the presence of a pensioner gives 
a prime age individual to leave her children at home and look for work elsewhere.    
3.4.6 Estimating predicted expenditure functions  
This section discusses how counterfactual expenditure estimates for households in the no 
migration situation can be developed by using predicted expenditure equations to identify the 
expenditures of households with and without remittances. The methodology for obtaining 
these estimates follows the literature on the evaluation of programs and have been used 
previously by Dimova and Wolff (2011) and Adams, Cuecuecha and Page (2008). 
This is done in two steps. First, I start with observed expenditures as reported in the survey. 
And, using the estimated parameters, I predict expenditures for households of type j, given 
that they chose type j. specifically, 
 ,      -          [
 (  
  )
   (  
  )
]                                      (3-8) 
 
where   is a correlation coefficient between the error terms in the outcome and treatment 
equations.  And similarly, 
 ,      -        [
  (  
  )
   (  
  )
]                                                   (3-9) 
 
As a second step, I obtain counterfactual expenditures for households defined as the expected 
value of expenditures for households of type r, conditional on them choosing type j. For each 
household, I compare observed income with the potential outcome of participating in 
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migration. Subsequently, I need to consider the total gross benefit (or loss) for all households 
that participated. For each participant, with characteristics X and Z, I can compare the 
outcome     with the expected outcome with no migration, that is  ,      -. Under the 
normality assumption that  (     )        
     )  I can estimate the average treatment 
effects model of per capita expenditure which account for the possibility if non-random 
selection of household s into migration treatment. 
The difference in per capita expenditure between remittance and non-remittance households is 
thus 
 ,      ] -    ,      ]   =       [
 (  
  )
 (  
  ).   (  
  )/
]  (3-10) 10.  
 
If the selectivity term is negative, it provides evidence in favour of overestimated levels of per 
capita expenditure because of the selection of households with genuinely lower living standard 
standards into receiving a remittance.  Conversely, if lambda is positive, OLS would 
underestimate per capita expenditure because households with higher living standards were 
selected into receiving remittances. The correct estimates would have to be computed net of 
selectivity bias. 
                                                 
10 In the likelihood estimation results (in STATA 11), the   and    are not directly estimated. Instead, the natural 
logarithm of    and the inverse hyperbolic tangent of    are estimated directly. The hyperbolic tangent is 




   




3.5 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.5.1 Data Sources 
The analysis in this chapter uses two South African data sets, the income and expenditure 
survey (IES) and labour force survey (LFS), collected by Statistics South Africa in the year 
2000. Both surveys draw on a nationally representative sample covering about 28000 
households and contain information on an array of socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics. The IES is fielded every five years and focuses on household expenditures, but 
also collects information on various income sources. However, the IES is not designed to 
collect in-depth information on demographic and labour market attributes of household 
members. The LFS, on the other hand, has greater depth on the demographic and labour 
market characteristics of respondents.   
In the year 2000, Statistics South Africa carried out the two surveys using approximately the 
same sampling framework.  As such, the IES can be merged with the September wave of the 
LFS data files (see Pauw, 2005)11.  The merged data set thus avails information on 
demographic composition of household members, labour market participation, educational 
attainment and various income sources, including regular incomes from family members living 
elsewhere. 
Neither the IES nor the LFS is designed as a migration survey. Nonetheless, the survey 
instruments contain information that is relevant for the purposes of this study.  A major 
                                                 
11 The most recent available IES (ie the 2005/6 version) is not compatible with the LFS 
because different samples were used in the survey. Further, a number of significant changes 
were incorporated in the new survey instrument such that it is not directly comparable with the 
2000 version.  
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limitation with the data sets, though, is that it is not possible to directly observe absent family 
members and hence, households that participate in migration are only identifiable indirectly. 
Specifically, migrant households are known only if they report that they receive income from 
family members living elsewhere. 12 The question on remittances is covered in both surveys, 
albeit differently. The LFS, on its part, asks whether the household received 
income/remittances from family members living elsewhere while the IES asks how much 
income the household received from family members who were living elsewhere on the survey 
date.  
In light of this, it is important to note the possibility of misclassifying households if we 
categorise them in terms of whether they received remittances or not.  That is, some 
households may have family members living elsewhere as migrants but who do not send 
remittances, in which case they would be classified as non-migrant households. In the absence 
of detailed data on migrants, it is not possible to ascertain the extent of these misclassifications.   
Dimova and Wolff (2008)  attempt to circumvent the misclassification problem by primarily 
focusing on (the impact of) remittances while allowing migration status to play a secondary 
role. The Dimova-Wolff approach seems plausible even in the case of South African 
households. In particular, it is important to note that the indigenous African household often 
comprises many extended family members and thus differs from the household as referred to 
in standard western literature (Russell, 2003). Specifically, Russell argues that in contemporary 
Southern Africa, the tradition of patrilineal descent in black families entails a much wider set of 
options for co-residence as relatives disperse to make a living in the global economy. Indeed, 
                                                 
12 The September version of the LFS began to include a dedicated migration section, starting 
with its 2001 edition. However, the LFS does not contain information on household income 




the African household comprises a broader formation, often including aunts, uncles and other 
relatives. This, he compares with the western household which has bilateral descent and 
therefore a fairly standard pattern of co-residence.  In light of this observation, remittances 
may flow between extended family members rather than simply between parents and their 
children.  For this reason, I follow Dimova and Wolff (2008) in highlighting the welfare impact 
of remittances. 
Table 3.1 below presents a list of variables used in the estimations of this chapter.  The table 
includes expenditure, explanatory variables and a set of exclusion restriction. The sample 
characteristics are in turn discussed in the next subsection. 
 
Table 3.1 : Description of Variables 
variable name  description 
Expenditure natural log of per capita household expenditure 
Remittance dummy variable for remittance receipt:  yes= 1 (LFS 2000) 
Poor poor (per capita income below higher poverty line) 
Ultra poor poor (per capita income below lower poverty line) 
household head characteristics 
Age age of household head in years 
age squared age squared /100 
Gender dummy variable for gender of household head: female=1  
lives with spouse head of household is married and lives with spouse 
(sp_present=1, 0 otherwise 
Married dummy variable for marital status: married=1, 0 otherwise 
 
Primary attended primary education, at most 
Secondary attended secondary education, at most 
post-secondary attended post-secondary education, at most 
human capital characteristics 
highest education maximum years of education for members aged 18-59 
average education average years of education for members aged 18 to 59 
number of infants number of household members younger than 7 
number of children number of household members aged between 7 and 18 
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number of pensioners number of household members aged 60 and older 
adults with primary education number of household members aged 19-59 with primary 
education  
adults with secondary 
education 
number of household members aged 19-59 with secondary  
education  
adults with postmatric 
education 
number of household members aged 19-59 with post-
secondary education 
exclusion restrictions 
Network proportion of household receiving remittances in a primary 
sampling unit 
share of female-headed 
households  
proportion of households that are female headed in a primary 
sampling unit 
number of female-headed 
households 





3.5.2 Sample Characteristics 
 Table 3.2  below contains a summary of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
of all rural households and the sub-sample that receives remittances according to the 2000 IES 
and LFS data. The broader sample comprises only those households that are identified13 as 
Black/African and living in rural14 areas of South Africa while the subsample of remittance 
households includes those who responded positively in the LFS to the question of whether or 
not they received remittances. About 23 percent of all rural African households reported that 
they were receiving remittances. However, of these remittance households, only about 75 
percent of these remittance households gave a positive amount of remittances in the IES. It is 
possible that they did not receive any remittance in the previous year, though they had a 
                                                 
13 Household demographic type is identified by population group of household head. 
14Slightly over half of South Africans reside in urban areas according to the 2000 IES and LFS. 
However, remittances are heavily biased towards rural households, with about 64 percent of 




migrant benefactor or indeed there might have been an error in either of the surveys. 
However, I stick to the remittance sample in terms of the LFS response, and hence include the 
possibility of migrant households which received zero remittance in the year.  
 Table 3.2: Household Summary Statistics 









T-test (rem vs. 
non-rem 
households) 
Sample size 10045 2570 7475  
Sample proportion 1 0.23 0.77  
Mean per capita     
Income 5729 (9352) 2824 (4058) 6728(10391) 27.03 
Expenditure 5780 (8989) 3208 (3883) 6664(10018) 24.87 
Reported nonzero 
remittances (IES) 
 0.72 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43)  
Poverty incidence (headcount 
index) 
    
Poverty line 0.51 0.71 (0.45)   
Ultra poverty line 0.29 0.45 (0.49)   
Household head 
characteristics 
    
age (in years) 48.2 (16.9) 43.9 (17.5) 49.7 (16) 14.66 
Female 0.46 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) 0.38 (0.49) -27.8 
Married 0.52 (0.49) 0.47 (0.49) 0.54 (0.5)  
Education     
no education 0.31 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47) 4.38 
Primary 0.39 (0.49) 0.38 (0.45) 0.39 (0.49) 1.07 
Secondary 0.26 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) 0.24 (0.43) -5.31 
post-secondary 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.17) -1.19 
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9.12 (0.09) 8.67 (0.05) 8.78 (0.05) -4.26 
Other household 
characteristics 
    
Household size 4.44 (0.03) 4.77 (0.06) 4.32 (0.04) -4.26 
Number of infants 0.71 (0.01) 0.89 (0.02) 0.64 (.0.95) -10.56 
Number of children 1.45 (0.02) 1.87 (0.03) 1.31 (0.02) -10.59 
Number in working age 1.88 (0.01) 1.71 (0.02) 1.94 (0.02) -15.7 
number of pensioners 0.36 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.40 (0.63) 10.83 
Human capital     
Adults with primary 
edu 
0.77 (0.01) 0.82 (0.01) 0.65 (0.02) 9.02 
Adults with sec. edu 0.67 (0.01) 0.68 (0.02) 0.66 (0.01) -1.23 
Adults with tertiary edu 0.28 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.52 
remittance household 
in PSU 
0.06 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)  
Source: own calculations using IES and LFS 
Notes: 1.Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * Proportion of IES remittance 
households that also reported receiving remittances in LFS. 
 
As in chapter 2, I use the Hoogeven-Ozler (2006) normative poverty line. According to their 
cost of basic needs calculations, a suitable poverty line for South Africa lies between 322 and 
593 rands per capita per month in 2000 prices. In addition, they also use the US $2/day poverty 
line (which is also popularly used in international literature) to describe what is happening to 
the welfare of those at the bottom end of the distribution. The latter equates to 174 rands per 
month in year 2000 prices. Using these poverty lines, I am able to categorise the chosen sample 
into poor and non-poor households. In this study, I term those below the lowest poverty line 
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(at R174 per month) as ultra poor, as opposed to the larger subset of the poor who live below the 
R322 per month poverty line. 
The mean per capita consumption expenditure of remittance households is about half of the 
average in the broader sample, indicating that remittance households are poorer on average 
than the average rural African household. Indeed, remittance households are proportionately 
over-represented in the poor categories, at both the higher and lower poverty lines.  About 71 
percent of remittance households are poor, when considered at the higher poverty line, 
representing a considerably higher proportion than the national headcount of 51 percent.  
Similarly, the ultra-poverty line sits above 45 percent of remittance households as compared to 
only 29 percent of all households.  
Although remittance households are poorer, they have more educated household heads than 
non-remittance households. About 31 percent of all rural households (in the sample) are 
headed by a person who has no formal education, while 39 percent had some primary 
education. The subsample of remittance households has slightly lower proportions in both 
categories, with 27 percent having no education and 38 percent having received only primary 
education. This would seem to suggest that heads of remittance households are 
proportionately more educated than their counterparts in non-remittance households. 
 
With an average household size of 4.8 individuals, remittance households are slightly larger 
than non-remittance households, which have an average household size of 4.4. When 
disaggregated by age category at the household level, the difference appears to come from a 
larger number (and proportion) of individuals below the age of 19. Remittance households 
have more minors (aged under 18), and hence a larger child dependency ratio than the average 
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household.  In sum, the sample characteristics portray remittance households in rural South 
Africa as poorer and larger, on average but with a higher education attainment record. 
3.6 Results and discussion 
3.6.1 Migration, remittances and per capita expenditure 
I first look at the selectivity corrected impact of remittances on per capita expenditure and the 
determinants of remittance receipt.  
Table 3.3  below shows maximum likelihood estimates of the per capita expenditure model 
alongside the remittance equation. I report three columns of each pair of equations pertaining 
to three specifications based on the different representations of the education variable (that is, 
maximum, average and heads education attainment).  Treatment effects15 model of per capita 
expenditure estimated using two-step method is reported in  Table 3.4 and the per capita 
expenditure model estimated using ordinary least squares procedure in Table 3.5. 
The inverse mills ratio (lambda) in Table 3.3 is positive (in all three specifications) and 
statistically significant suggesting that the error terms in the remittance and expenditure 
equations are positively correlated.  Parameter estimates obtained from OLS estimation would 
hence be biased (upward). This positive correlation means that unobserved factors that make 
remittance receipt (or migration) more likely tend to be associated with higher per capita 
expenditure. That is, households that receive remittances are more likely to have been 
positively selected in terms of their unobserved characteristics. Conversely, households that are 
less likely to receive remittances will have been negatively selected in the same regard.  Further,  
                                                 
15  Models with endogenous binary regressor variable(s) are a special case of instrumental variable models. A 




Table 3.3: Per capita expenditure model using treatment effects estimation (FIML16) 
 model A  model B  model C 
variables expenditure Remittance  expenditure remittance  expenditure remittance 
         
age 0.004 -0.060***  0.006* -0.055***  0.001 -0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006) 
age_sqrd -0.001 0.040***  -0.003 0.035***  -0.001 0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.006) 
female_head -0.118*** 0.618***  -0.159*** 0.634***  -0.143*** 0.633*** 
 (0.026) (0.045)  (0.027) (0.045)  (0.027) (0.045) 
Married 0.177*** 0.181***  0.188*** 0.185***  0.184*** 0.184*** 
 (0.023) (0.045)  (0.023) (0.045)  (0.023) (0.045) 
educ_primary 0.248*** 0.233***       
 (0.029) (0.054)       
educ_secondary 0.365*** 0.041       
 (0.039) (0.061)       
educ_postsec 0.942*** -0.285***       
 (0.053) (0.079)       
n_infants -0.056*** 0.024  -0.059*** 0.034  -0.041*** 0.033 
 (0.012) (0.022)  (0.012) (0.022)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Hhsize -0.147*** 0.036***  -0.148*** 0.021**  -0.171*** 0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.010) 
adults_primaryedu -0.091*** -0.196***  -0.102*** -0.081***  -0.105*** -0.081*** 
 (0.017) (0.031)  (0.013) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.022) 
adults_secondaryedu 0.049*** -0.056**  -0.073*** -0.022  -0.049*** -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.026)  (0.014) (0.025)  (0.014) (0.024) 
Remittance -0.611***   -0.622***   -0.605***  
 (0.072)   (0.071)   (0.072)  
Network  2.997***   2.991***   2.991*** 
  (0.078)   (0.080)   (0.080) 
educ_average    0.078*** -0.005    
    (0.003) (0.005)    
educ_maximum       0.058*** -0.007 
       (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 8.496*** -0.152  8.249*** -0.209  8.571*** -0.198 
 (0.101) (0.160)  (0.099) (0.156)  (0.098) (0.152) 
         
Observations 9,822 9,822  9,813 9,813  9,813 9,813 
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Variable definitions are provided in table 3.1  
 
                                                 
16 Full information maximum likelihood method 
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Table 3.4: Per Capita Expenditure Model (Two-step method) 
 Model A  Model B  Model C 
VARIABLES expenditure Remittance  expenditure remittance  expenditure remittance 
         
Age 0.008** -0.064***  0.010*** -0.059***  0.004 -0.060*** 
 (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.006) 
age_sqrd -0.005 0.045***  -0.006** 0.040***  -0.004 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005) 
female_head -0.138*** 0.671***  -0.182*** 0.685***  -0.168*** 0.686*** 
 (0.022) (0.036)  (0.022) (0.036)  (0.022) (0.036) 
Married 0.176*** 0.193***  0.181*** 0.198***  0.177*** 0.198*** 
 (0.020) (0.037)  (0.019) (0.037)  (0.019) (0.037) 
educ_primary 0.255*** 0.256***       
 (0.025) (0.050)       
educ_secondary 0.373*** 0.073       
 (0.029) (0.058)       
educ_postsec 0.935*** -0.168**       
 (0.035) (0.068)       
n_infants -0.053*** 0.040*  -0.054*** 0.048**  -0.037*** 0.048** 
 (0.012) (0.022)  (0.011) (0.022)  (0.012) (0.022) 
Hhsize -0.153*** 0.036***  -0.155*** 0.023**  -0.178*** 0.023** 
 (0.005) (0.010)  (0.005) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.009) 
adults_primaryedu -0.094*** -0.204***  -0.103*** -0.092***  -0.104*** -0.092*** 
 (0.014) (0.029)  (0.011) (0.021)  (0.011) (0.021) 
adults_secondaryedu 0.037*** -0.058**  -0.080*** -0.037*  -0.054*** -0.030 
 (0.013) (0.024)  (0.012) (0.023)  (0.012) (0.023) 
Remittance -0.598***   -0.592***   -0.573***  
 (0.044)   (0.043)   (0.043)  
Network  3.054***   3.057***   3.058*** 
  (0.078)   (0.078)   (0.077) 
         
         
educ_average    0.076*** 0.002    
    (0.002) (0.005)    
educ_maximum       0.056*** -0.002 
         
Lambda 0.217***   0.202***   0.195***  
 (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.027)  
         
Constant 8.447*** -0.210  8.223*** -0.275*  8.541*** -0.232* 
 (0.080) (0.146)  (0.078) (0.142)  (0.077) (0.137) 
         
Observations 9,822 9,822  9,813 9,813  9,813 9,813 
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Variable definitions are provided in table 3.1 
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Table 3.5: Per Capita Expenditure Equation estimated using OLS17 estimation 
 model A model B model C 
Variables expenditure expenditure Expenditure 
    
Remittance -0.296*** -0.311*** -0.304*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Age 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
age_sqrd -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
female_head -0.196*** -0.237*** -0.219*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Married 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.158*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
educ_primary 0.225***   
 (0.029)   
educ_secondary 0.360***   
 (0.039)   
educ_postsec 0.968***   
 (0.053)   
educ_average  0.079***  
  (0.003)  
educ_maximum   0.059*** 
   (0.003) 
n_infants -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.044*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hhsize -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.177*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
adults_primaryedu -0.070*** -0.091*** -0.095*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
adults_secondaryedu 0.059*** -0.066*** -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant 8.303*** 8.062*** 8.386*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.082) 
    
Observations 9,841 9,832 9,832 
R-squared 0.388 0.411 0.394 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Variable definitions are provided in table 3.1 
 
                                                 
17 Ordinary Least Squares method 
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receipt of remittances come from the lower part of the income distribution. The finding that 
the receipt of remittances reduces household welfare could partly be explained by the fact that 
migration takes away productive household members and hence the income that they may 
have contributed to the household.  
I began by assuming that remittance, the dummy variable that characterises household as either 
migration-participating or not, is endogenous. A test of endogeneity confirms that remittance 
is not exogenous and a conclusion can be made that it is endogenous. (see Table 3.6 below)  
Table 3.6: Durbin-Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity on binary regressor remittance 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
 
Robust score chi2(1)            =  167.579  (p = 0.0000) 
  




The rest of the explanatory variables in the expenditure model have expected signs. Female-
headed households with larger numbers of children (under six years of age) and (therefore) 
larger households are likely, as the results suggest, having lower levels of per capita 
expenditure. In contrast, if the household head is married (and living with their spouse), the 
level of per capita welfare turns out to be better. The marriage status compares with unmarried 
status (due to widowhood, divorce or just single), each of which would seem to militate against 
better household welfare.  
The household head‟s education attainment also increases with household welfare, as expected. 
Advancement from primary to secondary levels of education, on the part of the household 
head, is compensated for by higher welfare returns.  However, while the head needs some 
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education for positive returns, the presence of   more adults with only primary education in the 
household reduces the welfare outcome. This is also in contrast with the presence of better 
educated (that is, with at least secondary school education) members who contribute positively 
to per capita welfare.  
Surprisingly, however, the results also suggest that the age of the household head does not 
matter for household welfare, but matters for remittance receipt.  However, in the OLS results 
(in table 3.3), the coefficient on the age variable is positive and statistically significant.  This 
could be explained in two ways: firstly, households with pensioners could indeed be facilitating 
migration. The second explanation pertains to the possibility of unobserved household 
likelihood ratio tests18 reject the null hypothesis that the error terms of the expenditure and 
remittance equations are not correlated. On the basis of these results, the alternative 
hypothesis that the remittance variable introduces endogeneity (due to selection bias) in the 
expenditure model is accepted, hence justifying the need for correcting for sample selection 
bias. 
The actual receipt of remittances, however, is associated with lower household expenditure. 
The negative coefficient on the remittance variable suggests that a household that receives 
remittances is likely to face lower welfare outcomes and vice versa. As noted earlier, most 
households that reported characteristics (as captured by the inverse mills ratio) being correlated 
with the age of the household head, and therefore, the change on magnitude of coefficient and 
standard error being due to multicollinearity. 
                                                 
18 Unweighted data was used to perform likelihood ratio tests. 
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Turning to the remittance equation (in table 3.2), the results suggest that if a household is 
female headed, larger in size and whose head has minimal education, it is more likely to receive 
remittances. In contrast, households with more educated adults are less likely to receive 
remittances. The variable that has been used as an exclusion restriction, migration networks, is 
also positive and significant indicating that social networks improve the chance of migration 
and subsequently remittances. 
Table 3.3 presents the treatment effects model estimated using the two-step procedure. Results 
are very similar to the maximum likelihood estimations discussed in the preceding paragraphs, 
with slight differences in the magnitude of some of the coefficients.  





3.6.2 Remittances and Poverty 
As a next step in the analysis of this chapter, I estimated the probability of being in poverty, 
using the same predictors as in the previous section and accounting for sample selection in 
similar manner.  Results of the probit model with sample selection estimations are presented 
on tables 3.6.  Columns (1) and (2) in table 3.6 (below) give results estimated on a poverty 
indicator using a higher poverty line while columns (3) and (4)  a lower poverty line.  
 
When the lower poverty line is used, results seem to suggest that the two error terms are 
correlated whereas at the higher poverty line the correlation loses its significance and changes 
sign. This appears to suggest that the hypothesis of endogeneity holds true only for some part 
of the income distribution. That is, correcting for sample selection is valid when the sample is 
divided at the lower poverty line. 
At the lower poverty line, households that are headed by older females and which have more 
children under the age of six are more likely to be poor. Household size also enhances the 
likelihood of being in poverty. However, at the higher poverty line, the age of the household 
head as well as number of infants do not matter anymore.  
Factors that reduce the probability of being in poverty include education and marital status of 
the head. Households headed by married individuals are less likely to be poor. The education 
attainment of the head also increases progressively the chances of being above the poverty line. 
In addition, if other household members have some post primary level education, the 













variables poor_hpl poor_hpl rem1  poor_lpl rem1 
rem1 0.591*** 1.097***  0.399*** 0.715***  
 (0.052) (0.103)  (0.042) (0.086)  
Age -0.006 0.002 -0.057*** 0.018*** 0.024*** -0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Agesq 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender 0.435*** 0.302*** 0.628*** 0.224*** 0.144*** 0.636*** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) 
Married -0.162*** -0.189*** 0.171*** -0.182*** -0.206*** 0.172*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.046) 
p_educ -0.219*** -0.256*** 0.238*** -0.170*** -0.195*** 0.238*** 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.055) (0.049) (0.049) (0.055) 
s_educ -0.320*** -0.333*** 0.022 -0.256*** -0.264*** 0.028 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
t_educ -1.892*** -1.780*** -0.569*** -1.500*** -1.444*** -0.552*** 
 (0.128) (0.124) (0.116) (0.155) (0.153) (0.116) 
nlt6 0.044 0.041 0.024 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.026 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) 
Hhsize 0.306*** 0.283*** 0.038*** 0.257*** 0.246*** 0.039*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Hcapprim 0.058 0.094** -0.201*** 0.014 0.037 -0.197*** 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Hcapsec -0.262*** -0.234*** -0.048** -0.220*** -0.206*** -0.049** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
mig_net -0.446**  3.002*** -1.452***  2.992*** 
 (0.176)  (0.077) (0.159)  (0.076) 
Constant  -0.703*** -0.254  -1.620*** -0.282* 
  (0.180) (0.164)  (0.162) (0.167) 
Athrho   -0.387***   -0.232*** 
(0.052) 
   (0.065)    
       
Observations  9,862 9,862  9,862 9,862 
1. Standard errors in parentheses 





only a primary education, they do not make any difference to the likelihood of exiting or 
entering poverty. 
3.7 Conclusion 
I set out in this chapter to estimate the household welfare impact of migration and remittances 
in Black rural households of South Africa. I used a treatment effects model of household per 
capita expenditure in order to account for the possibility of self-selection on the part of 
migrant households. I find evidence of sample selectivity, where households that would 
naturally be exposed to higher welfare outcomes are more likely to participate in migration and 
receive remittances. However, unlike previous studies on South Africa, the (short term) impact 
of remittances on household welfare is negative. It is likely that although many migrant 
households are not in the higher brackets of income distribution, the most indigent 
households are not able to participate in migration. This result bodes with Gelderbloom (2007) 
who suggested that poverty constrains migration in South Africa.  The results also highlight 
the importance of careful modelling of the poverty effects of migration, which may not be 
captured when descriptive methods are employed. However, it is important to properly qualify 
these results.  Although the model attempts to capture collective effects at the household, 
migration may have broader (and community level) impacts effects which can only be 




4  Determinants of  Migrant’s Remittances: Evidence from 
South Africa 
4.1  Introduction 
In the second chapter, we showed that remittances are a non-negligible income component for 
many black households in South Africa.  The present chapter interrogates new nationally 
representative survey data to investigate the microeconomic determinants of migrants‟ 
remittances.  Specifically, the chapter examines the role of gender and locational differences in 
the context of the insurance motives.   In what follows, I begin by making a case for the study 
of remittances by offering a brief background from the international literature. Thereafter, I 
give an overview of theoretical and empirical literature on income transfers and remittances.   
4.2 Remittances in the international literature 
The economic impact of migrants‟ remittances - the monetary and non-monetary 
contributions sent by migrants to their original countries - has attracted increased attention 
over the recent past.  This renewed wave of interest was largely ignited by reports of rapid 
growth in international remittance flows to low- and middle-income migrant sending countries 
since the 1990s19 . Moreover, comparisons between remittances and other foreign resource 
inflows indicate that remittance volumes caught up (and in some cases, exceeded) development 
aid flows as well as foreign direct investment to many low income countries (World Bank, 
2009). Propelled by these observations, the development research agenda has resuscitated a 
                                                 
19 The World Bank global economic prospectus (2006) reports that remittances to developing 
countries  increased from about $31 billion  in 1990 to about $200 billion  fifteen years later . 
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lively debate on the migration-development linkages. Succinctly, contemporary development 
discourse has sought to understand the economic linkages between labour migration, migrants‟ 
remittances and welfare changes in the receiving economies, both at household and 
macroeconomic levels. The literature appears to generally suggest that remittances, and hence 
migration, have net positive effects on the welfare of those left behind even though some 
studies fail to find evidence of a positive effect on economic growth (Acosta et al, 2008; Singh 
et al, 2010).  
 
In spite of this research interest, much of the remittance work remains restricted to case 
studies of Latin American countries where the dominant migration stream flows north into the 
United States of America and Canada.  Other parts of the world, most notably the sub-Saharan 
Africa, have received disproportionately less attention. Indeed, much of the current knowledge 
on migrants‟ remittance motivations and welfare effects, in the African case largely infers from 
aggregate secondary data analysis which could be highly dubious (Brown, 1997).  Interestingly, 
though, both the World Bank (2009) and the United Nations development arm (UNDP, 2009) 
highlight the importance of labour migration and remittances in developing countries, the 
majority of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. Crucially, their reports also recognise the critical 
role that internal labour migration plays as a livelihood strategy for many indigent rural 
households. Furthermore, many resource-constrained people fail to migrate across 
international borders due to high migration costs (Ghatak et al, 1996), which suggests that the 





In addition to the high levels of poverty, inequality and income volatility, the unique context in 
which remittances take place in developing countries fortifies the case for paying particular 
attention to their behaviour and motivating factors (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). That is, 
many developing countries are also characterized by pervasive capital markets imperfections, 
which often fail to offer market response to the needs for credit and insurance of the majority 
of the population. Therefore, despite being voluntary and altruistic to a large extent, 
remittances differ from most private transfers observed in the industrialised world in that 
additional motives (insurance, investment, and exchanges of various types of services) are 
central to explaining transfer behaviour. Furthermore, with possibly  a few exceptions, private 
transfers in the Western countries either take place anonymously - in the sense that donors do 
not necessarily know the identity of the beneficiaries ( philanthropy, for example) - or within a 
very restricted familial group (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). By contrast, remittances are 
increasingly recognized as informal social arrangements within extended families and 
communities in the developing world.  
 
From a policy perspective, the determinants of remittances are key to unpacking poverty and 
inequality dynamics where labour migration is common. Indeed, while remittances are an 
injection of resources into the household, they may also be instrumental in uncovering the 
welfare incidence of public transfers depending on what factors motivate them.  More 
specifically, the literature identifies a number of factors that drive remittance supply. If, for 
instance, these remittances are driven by migrants seeking to increase their inheritance claims, 
then public transfers such as the old age pension crowd in remittances by boosting potentially-
inheritable household wealth. But if remittances are motivated by altruism, or occur only to 
equalise per capita consumption when individual incomes vary, then the pension will be 
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expected to crowd out private transfers, with remitters capturing some of the pension‟s 
benefits ( Jensen, 2003; Sienaert, 2007).  
4.3 Related theoretical literature  
In chapter one, I introduced the migration and development literature, and culminated our 
discussion with economic models that recognise migrant-sending households as an integral 
part of the migration process. I further identified, in the new economics of labour migration 
models, the role of remittances as the main economic link between migrants and their original 
households, families or communities. Quite often, the study of labour migration overlaps with 
remittances literature, although the two are and can be studied separately.  
 
A broad theoretical framework on the economics of giving encompasses family transfers, 
reciprocity and other forms of sharing. The microeconomic paradigms which attempt to 
explain the factors that motivate remittances form the core of this literature (for detailed 
reviews, see Rapoport and Docquier, 2005; Laferrere and Wolff, 2006). To a great extent, the 
economics literature on remittance behaviour is based on the influential work of Lucas and 
Stark (1985). In theory, remittance behaviour can be explained from the perspective of the 
remitter or indeed various combinations of remitter-recipient roles.  
4.3.1 Altruism and self interest 
The remitter can be motivated by altruism on the one hand or pure self-interest on the other. 
Under altruism, remittances could be a manifestation of behaviour where the remitters or 
migrants only care about their beneficiaries. Economists assume that migrants/remitters are 
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purely altruistic if they derive positive utility from the welfare of their original households 
(Stark, 1991; Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002).  The migrants are thus concerned with the 
situation of their original households to whom they send remittances so as to enable their 
family to smooth consumption.  
Altruistic behaviour would manifest in two key relationships, if tested empirically (Funkhouser, 
1995; Vanwey, 2004). First, it implies a negative relationship between remittances from a 
sender and pre-remittance standard of living of the recipient.  That is, the altruistic remitter will 
send more when the beneficiary‟s income declines and less when the opposite obtains. 
Secondly, altruistic behaviour implies a positive relationship between remittances from a 
sender and the pre-remittance standard of living of the sender. The remitter will send more as 
his standard of living improves. Together, these relationships imply that a migrant who 
behaves altruistically will return income or goods to his or her family of origin in proportion to 
his or her income, ceteris paribus, and the number of dependents in the origin household and in 
inverse proportion to his or her family of origin.  The reverse should obtain for families of 
origin: they will remit in proportion to their income and in reverse proportion to the number 
of their dependents and to the migrants‟ income (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). 
 
If migrants act in their own interest, their remitting behaviour will be independent of the 
welfare of their original household or family. Indeed, as pointed out by Lucas and Stark (1985), 
the self-interested motive could manifest in a number of ways and for various reasons. For 
instance, the migrants could be motivated by their own aspirations to inherit wealth or assets 
in future. In this regard, the migrant may send remittances in exchange for various types of 
services, including taking care of assets.  This is often a sign of temporary migration where the 
migrant intends to return to the original home.  In addition, they may send remittances to be 
94 
 
used to acquire assets in the home area. Accordingly, remittances are expected to increase with 
the household‟s assets and income, the probability of inheriting, the migrant‟s wealth and 
income but decrease with risk aversion. 
 
However, in reality remitters are not necessarily held at either ideological corner. Rather, they 
may act in a number of ways that reflects both motives. In addition, the remittance 
beneficiaries arguably have a role in the remittances processes. The influential work of Lucas 
and Stark (1985) on factors that motivate labour migrants to send remittances arguably 
represents an important turning point in the literature on determinants of remittance 
behaviour. In their view , Lucas and Stark argue that remittances are necessarily linked with 
migration decisions which are taken at the household level, and therefore,  should be 
understood in that broader context20. The Lucas-Stark school of thought was a significant 
departure from earlier approaches which were largely shaped by neoclassical thinking and 
hence viewed labour migration as an investment strategy on the part of migrating individual, 
aimed at maximising their lifetime earnings (Todaro, 1969; Harris Todaro, 1970).  
4.3.2 Migrants’ remittances in the new economic of labour migration (NELM) 
While the motives discussed in the previous section focus on the remitter‟s perspective, the 
new economics of labour migration departs from the individual-centred approach to include 
motives that incorporate the migrant sending household. Lucas and Stark (1985) identify these 
intervening familial perspectives in the realms of co-insurance and repayment of investment in 
human capital. Under tempered altruism – also termed enlightened self-interest – it is posited 
that remittances consist of the repayment of an informal loan taken out by emigrants during 
                                                 
20 See also Stark and Bloom, 1985. 
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their youth in order to secure better education that later makes them more productive in the 
modern sector, constituting   the implicit loan arrangement model (Ghatak, Levine and 
Wheatley-Price, 1996; Poirine, 1997). A competing theory argues that remittances are part of 
an implicit coinsurance arrangement (Stark and Lucas, 1988; Yang and Choi, 2007). Hence, 
remittances are viewed as components of a self-enforcing, operative contract between the 
migrants and their original household. Remittance flows thus allow the household to undertake 
riskier ventures and have the ability to cope with economic shocks.  
 
Briefly, the NELM holds that, due to market failures in a source economy, a household 
member migrates to a different labour market, entering a co-insurance agreement with the 
household that is left behind. In this setup, remittances are sent home when the home 
economy faces shocks and to enable the household to invest in new technology. The 
household, on its part, also supports the migrant by paying for migration costs, for instance. 
Consequently, remittances increase when the household‟s income decreases or a negative 
shock occurs but also when the risk level of the migrant increases.  
 
Figure 1 below portrays the Lucas-Stark exposition of the structure of remittance motivations 
in a new economics of labour migration framework.  Enforcement of inter-temporal 
contractual arrangement is a function, not only of pure altruism or pure self-interest, but also 




Source: Carling (2008) 
Figure 4.1 :Remittances in the new economics of labour migration  
 
Beyond the Lucas-Stark framework, remittances could be explained as part of a strategic 
interaction aiming at positive selection of migrants. Under asymmetric information, where 
migrants are heterogeneous and their skills unobservable, it is posited that employers in a 
migrant destination economy will set wages according to the marginal productivity of the 
lowest skilled migrants. It follows, in theory that highly skilled migrants will attempt to obtain 
and sustain higher wages by „bribing‟ their lower skilled counterparts with the aim of 
preventing them from migrating (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005).  
4.4 Related Empirical Literature   
The theoretical models discussed in the previous section highlight the various motivational 
factors that are pivotal to remitting behaviour.  This section assesses relevant empirical 
literature. Specifically, I pay attention to the focus of various studies, pertaining to motivations 
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and methodology, with the intention of picking out important variables as well as identifying 
gaps in the literature. 
4.4.1 Modelling of remittances: correlates and predictors 
In most of the empirical work on remittances, the main issue concerns the degree of altruism 
that may be inferred from migrants‟ behaviour, since the pure altruism hypothesis lacks 
widespread empirical support. The task in these studies, therefore, is to identify and isolate the 
various motives which drive remittance behaviour.  The seminal work of Lucas and Stark 
(1985) on remittances from internal migrants in Botswana is one of the first studies that 
attempt to accurately discriminate between various motivations to remit. Lucas and Stark‟s 
estimates uncover a positive relationship between the level of remittances received and 
recipient households‟ pre-transfer income, hence ruling out pure altruism21 as an explanation 
for remittance behaviour. The authors interpret this finding as suggestive of the presence of 
other motives other motives, such as exchange, investment and inheritance could also play a 
role in determining remittance flows. 
 
In order to test whether remittances are a return to educational investment earlier in the 
migrant‟s life, Lucas and Stark explore the causal relationship between remittances and the 
migrant‟s years of schooling. Their estimations reveal a significant positive relationship, 
possibly indicating that remittances are likely to result from an understanding to repay initial 
educational investments. However, the combined effect of “own young” and schooling turned 
out to be positive but not highly significant, possibly suggesting that another motive is at play. 
                                                 
21 Pure altruism theory postulates that remittances are directed to poorer 




Hence, the authors turn to the inheritance motive which they test by exploiting the fact that 
sons are more likely than daughters to inherit assets. This, they do by adding a dummy variable 
for whether the household holds a cattle herd larger than twenty cattle. The results showed 
that indeed, sons remit more to families with larger herds while the associated coefficient is 
weakly negative for daughters and their spouses. Hence, sons behave significantly differently 
from daughters and other relatives in that they remit more to households with large herds, 
which is consistent with a strategy to secure inheritance.  However, it could also be the case the 
male children keep their cattle with those of the household, which could be explained as the 
exchange hypothesis. That is, remittances compensate the recipients for taking care of the 
sons‟ own cattle.  In a nutshell, the three potential explanations for the positive relation 
between remittances and the household‟s income were all shown to be consistent with the 
evidence from Botswana.  
 
In addition, Lucas and Stark also test the insurance hypothesis, which implies that remittances 
should increase during bad economic times in the rural sector and be directed to households 
who possess assets with volatile returns. They use, for each village sampled, an index reflecting 
the gravity of drought and include it in the remittance equation, both separately and interacted 
with (the logarithm of) two familial assets, namely cattle and agricultural land. When omitting 
the interaction terms, the coefficient on the drought index alone proved significantly positive, a 
finding that could be interpreted as suggestive of either altruism or insurance. Yet, with 
interactions terms included, existence of drought conditions or possession of more drought-
sensitive assets did not stimulate greater remittances per se, but the interactions of drought with 
these drought-sensitive assets did. This is consistent with rural households sending members to 




However, as noted by Rapoport and Docquier (2006), the same pattern of remittances could 
be reconciled with pure altruism if, for example, past remittances sent with an altruistic intent 
contribute to raise today‟s income.  This possibility is not explored by Lucas and Stark since 
longitudinal data were not available to them. The majority of micro-level studies face to the 
same limitation. 
 
Indeed, over the past three decades many papers have set out to analyse the determinants of 
remittances with reference to the framework suggested by Lucas and Stark (1985) in different 
empirical contexts.  Unlike Lucas and Stark, who encompassed  a number of motives,  most of 
the recent empirical literature has concerned itself with testing for a single motive  (e.g. 
Hoddinott, 1994; Gubert, 2002) or compare two competing factors (e.g. de la Briere et al, 2002; 
Cox et al, 1998). In particular, positive relationships between transfer amounts and recipients‟ 
incomes have repeatedly been uncovered by this literature in developing countries 
 
In a Peruvian study, Cox et al. (1998) analyse the determinants of private transfers which 
mainly consist of remittances. The authors focus on altruism versus exchange and test the 
effect of recipient households‟ pre-transfer incomes on the size and probability of remittances. 
Cox et al. (1998) test these two motives for both children-to-parents and parents-to-children 
private transfers, controlling for social security benefits, gender, marital status, household size, 
home ownership, education, and for whether transfers are transitory or permanent. In the case 
of child-to-parent transfers (which consist mostly of remittances), their results indicate that the 
probability of transfer is inversely related to parental income, a finding which is consistent with 
both altruism and exchange. But the effect of income on the amount transferred, conditional 
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on receiving a transfer, is first positive, then negative (i.e., inverse-U shaped), as suggested by 
the bargaining-exchange hypothesis. The same pattern applies to parent-to-child transfers, 
leading the authors to conclude that the bargaining-cum-altruism framework appears more 
powerful than the strong form of the altruistic model.  Furthermore, Cox et al. (1998) also find 
that private transfers are targeted toward the unemployed and the sick, a finding consistent 
with both altruism and insurance; however, public pension transfers and private transfers from 
children to parents are shown to be complements rather than substitutes, a finding which 
makes sense in a bargaining framework but is incompatible with altruism. It is notable that this 
result differs from the evidence uncovered by Jensen (2003) for South African households. 
Jensen reports that public pensions crowd out private transfers in South Africa, albeit partially. 
 
de la Brière et al. (2002), use data from migrant-sending households in the Dominican 
Republic, also test for the relative strength of two non-exclusive motives, namely inheritance 
seeking and insurance. After confirming support for both insurance and inheritance, with a 
larger effect being accounted for by the inheritance motive, the authors explore household 
heterogeneity and proceed to contrast migrants by various characteristics. Their results 
highlight that the relative importance of each motive is affected by the migrant‟s destination 
(United States or Dominican cities), the migrant‟s gender, and the composition of the receiving 
household. Interestingly, insurance appears as the main motivation to remit for female 
migrants who emigrated to the U.S.; the same result holds true for males, but only when they 
are the sole migrant member of the household and when parents are subject to health shocks. 
Investment in inheritance, on the other hand, seems to be gender neutral and only concerns 




While some studies have focused on assessing the impact of various motives, others compare 
determinants of remittances between countries (Funkhouser (1995) using decomposition 
methods.  Using data from receiving households in Nicaragua and El Salvador, he examines 
the determinants of remittances from international migration. Whereas the average remittances 
in San Salvador are over double in absolute as those from the Managuan data, it is interesting 
that he only finds small difference in the role of observable characteristics in explaining 
differences in the level of remittances. Rather, the difference is explained by differences in 
behavioural coefficients and by differences in self-selection bias of those who remit out of the 
pool of emigrants between the two countries.  
 
More evidence of the insurance motive has been uncovered in other studies by Gubert (2002) 
using Malian household data and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) for Guyana. Gubert (2002) 
tests various determinants of the remittance flow, using data from the Kayes region in Mali. 
Focussing on the insurance motive, she tests the impact of various shock variables: the number 
of household members who fell ill during the year turns out to be significant in most 
specifications. So too is the number of those who died during the year, but with a lower 
margin. Then, three different measures of crop income shock are tested as well, two of them 
generated as residuals from a production function. The results suggest that negative income 
shocks are a robust determinant of remittance flows, providing some further support to the 
insurance hypothesis. However, they do not reject the loan interpretation either, as a variable 
indicating whether the migrant received some financial assistance from a household member 




Some studies have explored the effect of having two or more migrants from one household.  
Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002) analyse the effect of other migrants in the household to 
distinguish between insurance or other self-interest motives and altruism. The authors argue 
that under the insurance or other self-interest motives, the number of migrants in the 
household should not affect the amount of per-migrant remittances. However under altruism, 
the presence of other migrants will reduce the average size of remittances, as then, the first 
migrant is not solely responsible for the wellbeing of the household. On the other hand, 
Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002) find support for the presence of altruism. They find a negative 
relationship between the number of migrants in the household and the probability and the 
amount of remittances in Guyana. Similarly Naufal (2008), shows that the amount of 
remittances sent by Nicaraguan migrants decreases as the number of migrants from the 
household increases. Hoddinott (1994) and Pleitez-Chavez (2004) find a positive impact of 
other migrant members on the probability of receiving remittances and an insignificant effect 
on the size of remittances. This is consistent with the self-interest and exchange theory of 
remitting whereby the presence of other members increases the probability that the migrant 
sends money and that any contract the migrant engages in with the household should not 
depend on the activity of other members of the household.  
 
Beyond insurance, investment and other sel interest motive, a number of studies have explored 
the remittance decay hypothesis which predicts that remittances decline over time.  That is, the 
longer the period of residence in the host country the lower the incidence of remittances, 
though for those who intend to return home eventually could be likely to remit more towards 
investments in assets, real estate and social capital. Lowell and de la Garza (2000) show that for 
every one percent increase in time spent by immigrants in the Unites States, the likelihood of 
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remitting decreases by two percent whereas Glystos (1997, 1998) found that Greek immigrants 
to Germany remitted larger amounts (due to return illusion) than migrants to Australia and 
United States. Aggarwal and Horowitz (2002), Osaki (2003) and Pleitez- Chavez (2004) find no 
evidence in favour of the existence of such relationship. Brown (1997) rejects the remittance-
decay theory together with the pure-altruism hypothesis when tested on data from the islands 
of Tonga.  
4.4.2 Beyond Altruism and Self interest 
Most of the empirical literature on remittance behaviour has been driven by the Lucas-Stark 
model, and hence there is a common and repeated focus on altruism. Carling (2008b) notes 
that this focus could however be unfortunate for several reasons. Firstly, most of the empirical 
work simply confirms what Lucas and Stark (1985) cogently argued, that altruism alone does 
not fully explain remittances. Furthermore, the two authors noted that it may be impossible to 
probe the balance between altruism and self-interest in the true motivation of migrants.  
Quite importantly, therefore, the empirical exploration of remittance motivations extends to 
contextual differences, which would generally fail to lend support to a general explanation for 
remittance motives. Carling (2008a) specifically identifies (i) migration histories and dynamics, 
(ii) the sociological nature of families and households, and (iii) the norms and values relating to 
migration and remittances as contextual differences that may contribute to the variations in 
remittance behaviour. 
To be clear, the migration context differs in a number of ways which in turn define the manner 
of remitting behaviour.  For instance, many people migrate temporarily and hence maintain a 
firm home in their place of origin, while others migrate permanently together with immediate 
household members and only remit to elderly parents. In similar regard, variation in migration 
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context would manifest between international and internal remittances, a matter that is often 
overlooked in the literature (Carling, 2008). 
The nature of families and households could also limit the extent to which remittance 
behaviour can be generalised. For instance, the degree of cohesion with and attachment to 
families ought not to be overlooked in understanding remittance behaviour.  It is notable that 
the NELM and most of its empirical pedigree applies to Mexico where patriarchal families 
dominate (Sana and Massey, 2005). Whether the same model may apply to matriarchal 
communities or indeed societies where conjugal unions are unstable is doubtful. It is thus 
important to realise that family transfers, in general, and remittances in particular take place 
within a variety of normative settings. According to Carling (2008b), moral values play an 
important role in migrants‟ activities including remittance behaviour. In some societies, 
migrants feel enormous pressure to remit because relatives feel entitled to receive support. 
The migrants themselves are hardly a homogenous group of individuals and the factors that 
drive remittance behaviour are likely to differ among the various types of migrants. As shown 
by Bowles and Posel (2005), factors such as genetic relatedness play a key role in determining 
remittances from labour migrants to their original homes in South Africa. Elsewhere, 
Hoddinot (1992) showed that remittance behaviour was significantly driven by parents‟ 
inheritable assets in the case of male migrants, while the same did not hold or female migrants. 
Evidence, both local and international, seems to suggest that women remit a substantially 
larger portion of their income than men (Rahman and Fe, 2009; Posel, 2001). The gender 
dimension also held true in the Dominican study (de la Briere et al, 2002) which showed in 
addition that remittance behaviour also differs by destination of migrants and the household 
composition of the migrant sending households.    
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4.4.3 On estimation methods 
Apart from the challenge of selecting appropriate variables, the choice of a statistical or 
econometric model is also crucial for achieving robust estimations and results. Existing studies 
on the determinants of remittances have used a variety of methodologies, with earlier studies 
(e.g. Lucas and Stark, 1985) mostly employing ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate 
remittance models. However, using OLS may be problematic due to a restriction on the values 
taken by the dependent variable, given that the sample (of potential remitters) usually consists 
of remitters and non-remitters. Specifically, if the migrant does not remit, the analyst has no 
data on the remittance levels although he may have data on the regressors. Hence, the 
dependent variable is a mixture of discrete and continuous parts and is thus censored at zero. 
This turns out to be one example of the censored dependent variable problem (Tobin, 1958; 
Amemiya, 1984). 
Although recognised as such,  a number of studies ignore the censoring problem, paying no 
special attention to the zero-inflated nature of the dependent variable, and proceed to use the 
ordinary least squares estimation procedure, which clearly leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates in this context (Madalla, 1992; Greene, 2005). Some analysts, while recognising the 
problem, attempt to circumvent it by restricting their sample to those observations with values 
greater than zero. But this too degenerates to using only the subsample of remitting migrants, 
which may hardly be representative of the population of migrants. This practice would 





The literature suggests at least two ways of correcting the data censoring problem22, the choice 
of which depends on whether the decision to remit is conceived as a two-stage sequential 
process or a one stage simultaneous process (Hoddinott, 1992). That is, the analyst estimates a 
probit model for the decision to remit followed by a corrected OLS equation. To be clear, the 
two stage procedure is employed where it is understood that the model separates the decision 
to remit and the subsequent decision of how to send. The two stage process has its own 
disadvantages too. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) argue that using a two-
part selection model can lead to identification issues. In these Heckman type models, the two 
equations ordinarily use the same set of explanatory variables.  However, due to the semi 
parametric nature of the model, one of the variables in the outcome equation should not 
appear in the participation equation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The challenge, notably, is to 
find defensible exclusion restrictions.  
Alternatively, if the remittance process is seen as simultaneous, then a Tobit model would be 
more appropriate (see for example Brown, 1997). The advantage of this approach is that it 
allows a regressor to affect the decision to remit and the level of remittances differently. 
However, the Tobit model may also yield biased estimates if the variance of additive error term 
is not constant (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). In addition, the Tobit requires that the residual 
be normally distributed, a condition that may not always obtain. 
Aside from the standard censored regression models, other specifications that are used, albeit 
less widely, includes the random effects model23 and the censored least absolute deviation 
estimator. The random effects model specifically takes care of clustering while censored least 
                                                 
22 Alternatively termed corner solution problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) 
23 In their specification, the error term is decomposed into a household random term and an 
individual error term 
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absolute deviation (CLAD)24 estimator gives consistent estimates even in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  Some econometricians suggest the use of a Poisson model instead of the 
log normal, arguing that the latter is not appropriate under conditions of heteroscedasticity 
(Santo Silva and Tenryro, 2006).   
Recognising the various problems that each of the models presents, a common approach is to 
employ several alternative statistical models to run the estimations. For example, de la Briere et 
al. (2002) use four different models and, in their final analysis, interpret the results that seem 
most robust.  
4.4.4 Existing work on remitting behaviour in South Africa 
Empirical literature on the determinants of remittances in South Africa remains slim. To my 
knowledge, Posel (2001a) was the first to estimate a microeconomic model of remittances for 
South African households using data from the remittance receiving household. Realising the 
short falls of using one-sided information,  the same author (Posel, 2001b), using a regional 
data set for the KZN province, estimates a remittance model based on information collected at 
the remittance sending point. Importantly, she notes that remittances are best modelled as 
flowing from one individual to another. Hence, in a sequel, Bowles and Posel (2005) treat the 
subject using the same 1993 PSLD data but with a dedicated focus on the genetic relatedness 
of the remitter and the sender. From a subsample of male migrants, they conclude that 
inclusive fitness is a much better predictor of remittance behaviour than average relatedness, 
although its effect is rather modest, explaining no more than a third of observed remittances. 
One reason for the scarcity of research is unavailability of appropriate migration and 
                                                 
24 CLAD estimates median regression for whole sample then iteratively re-estimates median 




remittance data. Even for the available studies, the data used is generally not sufficient. For 
instance, the PSLSD (Saldru, 1993), information about the person sending remittances cannot 
be mapped onto information about the remittance sent, which restricts Posel (2001) study to 
household with one migrant. Yet, many households have more than one migrant. Further, the 
PSLSD collects data at household level rather than at individual level.  
Over the past decade, several nationally representative surveys have collected information on 
migrants and remittances. Notably, the September version of the Labour Force Survey for the 
years 2001-2005 includes a section on migration. Most recently, SALDRU is informative on 
non-resident household members and contributions, both monetary and non-cash, flowing in 
and out of households, and importantly, to individuals within households. The present study 
thus differs from previous studies in that it uses a new dataset which has more disaggregated 
data about remittances. These data enable me to test the insurance and investment motives for 
remittances while also focusing on the role of gender and household composition in driving 
remittances.  
4.4.5 Summary of Empirical Literature Review 
In a nutshell, the characteristics of migrants‟ remittance behaviour fall into two main 
categories. That is, demand side pressures on the migrant from the remittance-receiving end, in 
particular, family and community ties and supply-side factors that affect the migrants capacity to 
remit, such as income and net wealth; motivational characteristics that influence the migrant to 
remit (for example, altruism and self-interest) and time-related factors such as the duration of 
the migrant‟s absence and environmental factors (Brown, 1997).   Carling (2008) summarises 
the locations of micro level determinants in the context of international remittances as 




Source: Carling (2008) 
Figure 4.2: A framework for remittance determinants  
 
Migrants send different amounts (and types) of remittances depending on a number of factors. 
Indeed, some do not send at all.  One place to look for explanations for remitting behaviour, 
therefore, is in the characteristics of the remittance supply side, that is, the potential sender.  
These (characteristics) pertain to the migrants earning capacity, thus including human capital 
characteristics of the potential remitter such as education attainment, age, gender, some 
indicator of economic activity in which they are involved and ethnicity. In many empirical 
analyses, the sender‟s income and wealth is also considered as supply side factors.   
Notably, this poses a data challenge, for the analyst is required to collect and use information 
from at least two households, both the remittance sending household and the receiving 
household, pertaining to the same period of time.  Indeed, due to data constraints, many 
studies treat the receiver as a household rather than an individual. Some authors, however, 
insist that remittances are sent by and directed to individual household members (Posel, 2001), 
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and therefore remittance models should necessarily focus on individuals rather than 
households.  Treated as such, the analyst is then able to characterise and explore the degree of 
relatedness between the sender and receiver (Bowles and Posel, 2005). Nonetheless, the 
presence and structure of the sending as well as receiving household cannot be ignored. 
  
Another neglected aspect concerns the social determinants of remittance behaviour. 
Obviously, most studies control for individual characteristics of both migrants and receiving 
households, but tend to disregard the social context in which remittances take place. 
Community characteristics are generally absent from remittance regression analysis, except in 
very specific cases (e.g., when data on rainfalls or other climate variables at the village level are 
used to account for the volatility of individual incomes).  However, few studies give weight to 
the potential benefits from broadening the analysis to include social determinants of 
remittances. One example is the study by Azam and Gubert (2005) on the Kayes region in 
Western Mali, which demonstrates the contextual fact that the migrants internalize the effect 
of their transfers on the social prestige of their clan that renders the implicit insurance contract 
enforceable. 
 
The geographical drivers of remittances are also found statistically significant in a study on 
remittances from Ghanaian and Nigerian migrants in the US, UK and Germany. Ecer and 
Tompkins (2010) find that altruistic reasons for remitting may be associated with higher levels 
of remittances, while more self-interested reasons for remitting are associated with lower levels 
of remittances. These results indicate that it may be difficult to design policies to encourage the 





The multiple locations of remittance determinants presented in the preceding subsections can 
have daunting implications for research. Specifically, the data requirements for an ideal analysis 
can be quite a stretch as they require multi-level information about both sender and receiver. 
Moreover, there seems to be a suggestion that proper unit of analysis would probably be at the 
individual (sender and receiver) rather than the household.  
The empirical evidence on migration and remittances in South Africa suggests that within-
household labour migration changed in the 1990s, while remaining a material feature of the 
labour allocation of (especially, but not exclusively, rural) households. The determinants of 
migration and remittance behaviour have been the focus of much less attention, with the very 
notable exception of the work of Posel (1999, 2001) and Bowles and Posel (2005).  
4.5 Data  
In the present chapter, I use household data from the first wave of the South African National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) (SALDRU, 2008), a nationally representative survey which 
includes about 31 thousand South African individuals who are drawn from approximately 7305 
households. In keeping with the previous chapters and the context of this study, I focus on the 
individuals from the black/African population group.   
The literature survey identified correlates of remittance behaviour at multiple locations in the 
remittance flow path, between and including the sending and receiving individuals. While the 
ideal estimation model would empirically include all the relevant factors, a number of studies 
use information collected at the receiving end only, and quite often at the level of the 
household only. This drawback is often the case due to data limitations in large scale national 
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surveys. Although the NIDS is also another large scale survey that is not custom-designed for 
labour migration, it nonetheless contains a wealth of information on incomes, including 
remittances, at the individual level. Importantly for this study, it identifies individuals as 
resident or non-resident household members as well as including all information on both the 
senders and receivers. 
In the ensuing empirical analysis, I first describe the characteristics of individuals who reported 
receiving or sending remittances in the survey. Every adult respondent was asked whether he 
had given or received cash or non-cash contributions to a person (who was residing elsewhere) 
in the year up to the date of survey. I use the responses to these two questions to identify the 
relevant sample for remittance behaviour analysis in terms of actual remittances sent or 
received and the potential remitters. This descriptive work serves as a prelude to the 
estimations of the remittance models, where I use information collected at the receiving end. 
The question on remittances was presented to adult respondents only and therefore the 
relevant sample of interest includes about 12 thousand African adults, of which 973 sent 
contributions to between one and six persons over the course of the 12 months prior to survey 
date. About 1247 reported receiving a remittance from at least one person in the same period 
of time.  Roughly, 10 percent of all African adults received remittances from at least one 
sender, while about 8 percent reported sending remittances. 
 
Sampling and Weights  
Concerning household and person weights, the NIDS (SALDRU, 2008) provides two sets of 
weights:  design weights and the post-stratification weights.  This is because the NIDS used 
two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the design weights were calculated as the inverse of the 
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probability of inclusion. In the second, the weights were calibrated to the 2008 midyear 
estimates (produced by Statistics South Africa).  The basis of the calculation of the design 
weights is the information that Statistics SA provided about the process of two-stage sampling 
from the Master sample. Two sets of calculations were necessary in deriving the design 
weights. First there is a calculation of the probability of sampling each population sampling 
unit (PSU) and, second, there is a calculation about the probability of including each specific 
household in each PSU in the SALDRU (2008) sample. The latter corrects for household non-
response.  
The second set of weights is the post-stratification weights. These weights adjust the design 
weights such that the age-sex-race marginal totals in the NIDS data match the population 
estimates produced by Stats SA for the mid-year Population Estimates for 2008.  
4.5.1 Characteristics of remitters 
 
Table 4.1 below presents summary characteristics of a number of variables pertaining to 
remitters. These include demographic information such as age, gender and marital status, but I 
also provide information on income, education attainment and location of residence.  
Among remitters, there are more male participants than there are women. The share of people 
who reported that they had sent remittances is about 62 percent which is nearly 19 percent 
larger than the share of males in the African population. This large share would be consistent 
with a number of related factors, primarily the fact that there are more men  in gainful 
employment than women and also that  there are still more men involved in labour  migration 




Table 4.1: Summary statistics of African Remitters [age>16yrs] 
Characteristic  Remitters All adults 
 
Personal    




Sample size  973 11,771 
Gender shares  
 
[male=1] 0.62 0.43 
 
Mean age (in yrs.) All 36.9 (11.1) 35.3 (15.6) 
 Male 37.3 (11.6) 33.9  (15.1) 
 Female 36.2 (10.5) 36.4  (15.9) 
    
Employment status [Yes=1,  0 otherwise] 0.67 0.26 




Education None  0.05 (0.23) 0.11(0.31) 
 Primary  0.20 (0.40) 0.21(0.40) 
 Secondary  0.49 (0.50) 0.58(0.49) 
 Post-sec  0.24 (0.43) 0.09(0.29) 
    
Marital status Married 0.38 0.26 
 Never-married 0.39 0.54 
 Other 0.23 0.20 
Share of population remitting by location (%)    
 National 11.8%  
 Rural 6.3%  
  Formal 22.1%  
   T.A. 3.8%  
 Urban  16.3%  
  Formal 17.0%  
  Informal 14.1%  
Household    
 Average size 2.9 (2.4) 4.9 (3.4) 
Income Mean, monthly 5991(8339) 3819(5697) 
Expenditure  Mean, monthly 4491 (6480) 3100 (4728) 
    
Notes 
1. Author‟s calculations using SALDRU (2008)  
2. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations  
3. Survey design weights were used in all sample-based computations 
 
Mindful that our sample comprises adults only (aged 16 and above), the average age of adult 
black South Africans is about 35.3 years, with women being slightly older on average than 
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men. This could be understood in the context of higher life expectancy for women. The 
average adult‟s age turns out to be slightly lower (by 1.3 years) than that of the average remitter 
in the same population grouping.  From the summary statistics in Table 4.1, the age difference 
is mostly accounted for by male remitters being slightly older than their female counterparts.  
 
The general expectation that most remittances would flow from migrant husbands to their 
wives, as was commonly the case under temporary labour migrancy, does not seem to be the 
predominant case, according to these data. Indeed, only 38 percent of all remitters are married 
while a similar share reported having no spouse (never married) at all.  This is consistent with 
the observation that remittances mostly go to parents and children. 
 
In the literature, the relationship between sender and receiver is potentially an important 
correlate of remittances flows. Table 4.2 below shows that the majority of remittances go to 
family members, although not exclusively to core/nucleus family members.  Indeed, roughly 
51 percent of the remittances were sent to biological parents or children. Spouses and partners 
comprised only 15 percent of the recipients, while only 11 percent of the receivers were 
biological siblings.   




(% of respondents received from) 
Receiver  
(% of respondents sent to) 
Spouse 21 16 
biological child 15 26 
Biological parent 30 26 
Other family members 24 26 
Non-family 10 6 




The distribution of receivers is quite similar to that of senders. A third of all senders were 
biological parents of the receiver, while 20 percent were spouses.   Non-family members 
comprise the smallest group with less than 10 percent of senders or receivers. 
 
In terms of education, the sample of remitters would appear to be more educated than the 
general population. Interestingly, even though this is the case, the survey shows that some 
without education also remit, albeit being a small proportion. That is, only 5 percent of these 
who remit have no education, as compared to about 11 percent in the population (being on the 
no education category).   For one to be able to remit, it logically follows that they must be 
earning money or, at least, has the means and wealth to remit. Therefore, most remitters are 
unsurprisingly in some form of employment.  
 
Further, in relation to both the employment and education factors, the location of residence of 
remitters is expected to correlate with one‟s ability to remit.  In the population, about 12 
percent of all adult blacks are remitters. However, urban centres have a larger share of 
remitters (about 16.3 percent) than rural localities, which present only 6.3 percent. Further, and 
perhaps more interesting, is the difference between population shares of remitters between 
residents in formal and informal/traditional areas.  In the rural areas, 22 percent of people in 
formal locations send remittances while only 3.8 percent of adults in traditional authority areas. 
Urban areas present a different picture in his regard. That is, the difference between urban-
formal and urban-informal is very narrow, although urban formal areas still have a higher 
representation. To the extent that many African people migrate to either rural formal or urban 
centres, these differences would be consistent with the poverty reducing impact of migration 




Turning to household level characteristics, table 4.1 above presents statistics for household size 
as well as income and expenditure. The average household size among African households is 
4.9 people. When we consider remitter households alone, the average size is much smaller at 
2.9 individuals.   Both household monthly earnings and expenditures are higher for household 
with remitting individuals than those without.   
4.5.2 Characteristics of remittance receivers 
Unlike remittance senders, among whom over 60 percent are men, the majority of remittances 
receivers are women. According to the NIDS data, about 66 percent of all receivers are 
women. The average age among the receivers is about 32, with males being overrepresented in 
the younger subset of receivers. The average age for male beneficiaries is 28 years old, which is 
5 years younger than their female representative counterpart. 
The distribution of receivers in terms of location of residence differs slightly with the 
population wide distribution.  Indeed, with about 57 percent of receivers residing in urban 
areas, there appears to be a 4 percent bias towards urban residence when compared with the 
African population distribution, which is about 53 percent urban-resident. A notable difference 
presents, specifically among rural residents, when the samples are considered as resident in 
formal versus informal localities. That is, the urban sample of receivers seems to be higher for 






Table 4.3: Summary statistics of remittance receivers  
  Remittance 
Receivers 
All adults 
Frequency  2,234,660 21,351,984 
  1247  
Percentage  10.5 100 
Characteristic    
Gender [male=1] 0.364 0.436 
Age All  32.5 (15.1) 34.5 (15.8) 
 Male 28.0 (13.1) 33.2(15.3) 
 Female 35.2 (15.6) 35.5 (16.2) 
Marital status Married 0.19 0.25 
 Never married 0.65 0.56 
 Other 0.16 0.19 
Employment status [Employed=1] 0.126 0.256 
    
Location Urban 56.6 53.3 
 Rural 43.5 46.7 
 Rural - formal 4.83 6.35 
 Rural -trad-authority 38.8 40.35 
 Urban-formal 42.6 40.25 
 Urban-informal 13.7 13.05 
    
Source: author‟s calculation using SALDRU (2008); numbers in brackets are standard 
deviations; survey design weights (SALDRU, 2008) were used in calculating  
 
 
4.5.3 Remittance magnitudes, flows and frequency 
Turning to the remittances magnitudes, Table 4.4 (below) provides statistics on remittances 
received or sent by individuals during the 12 months preceding the date of survey. The data 
suggest that women remit less on average than men, an observation that is consistent with 
existing evidence. At the same time, women appear to be recipients of larger amounts of 





Table 4.4 : Mean annual remittance income (in rands) by location and gender 
 Received Sent 
location of  
sender/receiver 
Male  female Male  female 
Urban 3628.79 3632.82 5996.046 3639.24 
 
(7117.65) (8192.92) (9893.74) (6492.27) 
 
551,111 708,183 1,164,770 659,902 
   
  
Non-urban 2736.70 4602.19 5542.57 3156.14 
 
(3709.53) (5324.61) (7307.66) (3346.11) 
 
263,337 712,029 354,098 252,818 
Source: author‟s own calculations using SALDRU (2008) 
 
Table 4.5 below shows a further disaggregation of remittance means by formal versus informal 
location (under both rural and urban areas) of sender/ receiver.   Focusing first in the rows 
labelled rural, the stats suggest that women receive more than me and that people in informal 
areas get more than those in formal.  However the differences are less pronounced on the part 
of rural senders although the statistics suggest that informal sends slightly more than informal. 
The patterns obtaining in the case of rural areas do not come out in the case of urban areas. 
Clearly though, people in formal urban receive more than those in informal urban. 
In essence, this analysis is consistent with the central proposition of this study which 
recognises the rural bias of poverty and points to remittances as an important driver of poverty 








Table 4.5: Mean annual remittance income in ran by location and gender 
 Formal area Informal area 
 male female Male female 
Receiver      
Rural 1653.82 4231.49 2860.54 4649.77 
 (2024.21) (5231.4) (3836.17) (5334.6) 
     
Urban 3776.75 4484.17 3133.76 1140.5 
 (7829.87) (9273.03) (3837.29) (1887.52) 
Sender     
Rural 5593.28 3169.52 5492.67 3144.44 
 (6018.64) (2782.37) (8384.54) (3770.24) 
     
Urban 6953.51 3942.73 2670.85 2339.96 
 (10910.29) (6764.979) (3193.67) (4953.73) 




4.6 Conceptual framework and estimation strategy  
I adopt a framework proposed by Yang and Choi (2007) to formalise the risk sharing (or 
coinsurance) behind migration and remittances.  The important question, in this regard, 
pertains to how we should expect remittance receipts to change when a household experiences 
a negative shock.  A fundamental theoretical result is that if there is a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of risk across individual entities (household members, in this case) in a risk-sharing 
arrangement, individual consumption should not be affected by idiosyncratic income shocks. 
Consider households consisting of two members, indexed by   *   +. Let one household 
member be located in the origin household and the other household member located in a 
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migration destination place. Assume that both household members work and are able to send 
funds back and forth to each other. 
 
Individuals have an uncertain income in each period  ,    
   depending on the state of nature 
     , which could be good or bad. Household member   consumes    
  and experiences 
within-period utility of  (   
 ) at time  . Let utility be separable over time, and let 
instantaneous utility be twice differentiable with   
    and   
     .  For the allocation of 
risk across household members to be Pareto-efficient, the ratio of marginal utilities between 
members in any state of nature must be equal to a constant:                                                                 
 
  
 (   
 )
  





      (4-1) 
for all states and time.    and    are the Pareto weights of members 1 and 2. Household 
members‟ marginal utilities are proportional to each other, and so consumption levels between 
members move in tandem. 
Let utility be given by the following constant absolute risk aversion function: 
  
 (   
 )    
  
    
 
 
    (4-2) 
Then, a relationship between individual household member     consumption and average 
consumption across the household members is obtained by: 
                
     ̅  
        (         )
 
    (4-3) 
Efficient risk sharing implies that an individual‟s consumption level depends here only on 
mean consumption in the household, and an effect determined by the individual‟s Pareto 
weight relative to the other‟s. Because this latter term is constant over time, changes in 
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consumption for each individual will depend only on the change in mean household 
consumption. Said another way, individuals face only household-level risk. 
The practical aspect of this type of risk sharing has some examples including sending 
remittances to another household member when that member experiences a negative shock. 
Let consumption of individual   in state    be the sum of income    
  and net inflows of 
remittances    
    
   
      
     
        (4-4) 
 
So then equation (4.3) can be rewritten  
    
      
    ̅  
        (         )
 
    (4-5) 
 
Yang and Choi (2007) demonstrate that equation (4.5) can be transformed into an empirically 
testable specification, by separating income    
  into two components, one permanent and the 
other transitory, such as  
   
    ̅     
       (4-6) 
where   ̅ is permanent and    
  is transitory.  Only the latter would be affected by the state of 
the world. 
Consequently, equation 4.5 can be re-written as  
   
                      (4-7) 
Where outcome variable    
  is remittance received and key variable Z is a transitory shock 
which causes changes on the domestic front.  Mean household consumption is represented by 
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a time effect      . Guided by the model in equation (4.6), I proceed to specify a general model 
for remittances in the next section. 
 
4.7 Specifying a regression model for remittance income 
Assuming there is a data generating process for remittances, this latent process can be 
expressed as   
  
    (  )           (4-8) 
Where    is a matrix of explanatory variables, including human capital and individual 
characteristics of the potential remitter and potential receiver, income and 
environmental/community characteristics. To be clear, the process that generates remittances 
is a function of the characteristics listed inside the brackets in equation (4.7). This process will 
ordinarily include random errors, which are explained in the next subsection.  
4.7.1  Statistical models and estimation issues 
As noted in the literature review, a number of issues have to be considered when estimating 
remittance equation. To be precise, for the reason that many potential remitters do not actually 
remit, the (dependent) variable that represents remittance flows would generally contain a 
disproportionate number of zeros. Ordinary least squares estimation is unsuitable for corner 
solution outcomes25 models (Wooldridge, 2002), as it known to yield unreliable (that is, biased 
and inconsistent) estimates. Indeed, such estimates would imply unreliable inferences even in 
large samples. Instead, the Tobit model is appropriate in handling censored dependent variable 
                                                 
25 More commonly termed censored data in the literature. 
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models.  While the Tobit is a simultaneous process model and is based on strong assumptions 
about the conditional data distribution and the functional form. Given that such a parametric 
model may be too constrictive, there are alternatives that treat the decision and how much to 
remit as separate and sequential processes. I first present the Tobit before outlining the 
alternative models. 
4.7.2 Standard censored regression model - Tobit 
For a randomly drawn observation      from the population, the Tobit model can be specified 
as  
  
            ,        (   
 )                                     (4-9) 
 
       (    
 )        (4-10) 
 
The dependent variable    denotes an underlying (remittance) process which produces    , the 
recorded value of remittances from the available data. The condition in equation 4.9 implies 
that observed remittances obtain at the underlying value (    ) only when    is greater than 
zero. Otherwise, (when      ) the observed value of remittances will be zero. The objective 
is then to estimate    , the vector of coefficient estimates, and variance    , where     is the 
vector of independent variables and   is the random variable that may be interpreted as the 
collective of all the unobservable variables that affect     . 
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Among various methods, the maximum likelihood is the most popular for estimating the Tobit 
model.  In order to unpack the effects of various regressors on the dependent variable, it is 
important to compute their respective marginal effects. 
Wooldridge (2003) shows that for a binary regressor, the Tobit partial effect 
  (   )




/           (4-11) 
while the partial effect for a continuous variable is  
  (       )
   






/   .
  
 
/3   (4-12) 









 is the inverse mills ratio. 
Although the Tobit model is able to handle censored data well, it has a few drawbacks, the 
main one being that it relies heavily on distributional assumptions. Indeed, if the error term is 
either heteroscedastic or non-normal, the maximum likelihood26 estimator is inconsistent 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Moreover, the Tobit estimator restricts the censoring 
mechanism to be from the same model as that generating the outcome variable.  That is, it 
makes the strong assumption that the same probability function generates both zeros and 
positive values. But, this need not be the case. Ultimately, these weaknesses could render the 
Tobit model inappropriate if some requisite assumption failed. For example, if those who send 
remittances have some unobservable characteristics different from those who do not, then the 
assumption of constant variance (homoscedasticity) would not hold.  As an alternative to the 
Tobit, some variants from of the class of two-stage estimation models have been suggested. 
Two-tiered models 
                                                 
26 Tobin (1958) proposed maximum likelihood estimation of the Tobit model and Amemiya 
(1973) provided a formal proof that despite the mixed discrete-continuous nature of the 
censored density usual maximum likelihood theory did apply. 
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In a more general setting, the censoring mechanism and outcome can be modelled separately 
we could split the remittance decision into two sequential parts, the initial decision being 
whether to send a remittance or not (i.e.     versus    ) while the second decision would be 
how much how much to remit, given that     . One distinct advantage of these models is 
that they allow common regressors of either equation to affect the two decisions differently. 
Moreover, this class of models also allows one set of regressors to explain the participation 
decision and a different set to explain the level of remittances (Mahuteau, Piracha, & Tani, 
2010). These two tiered models, while maintaining the assumptions about the functional form, 
partially relax the distributional assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
4.8 Regression analysis 
The regression analysis in this section is based on both ordinary least squares and standard 
Tobit estimators27.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of remittance income 
received by an individual in the 12 months to the date of survey, from a particular remitter.28 
The survey data provides information at both monthly level and for the 12 months prior to the 
survey date.  I experiment with both figures, taking full cognisance of the possibility that 
remittances could be subject to seasonal variability. In this regard, some of that seasonality 
could be ironed out in the annual figure. Furthermore, the monthly figure could represent a 
once off occurrence of remittance inflow and therefore carry little semblance of remitting 
behaviour. 
                                                 
27 Ordinary least squares results are presented alongside the censored regression parameters to 
provide a baseline for comparison.  
 
28 A few respondents in the survey received remittances from 2 or more senders.   For ease of 
estimation, the characteristics of the sender that I include are those of the first remitter. 
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Selection of explanatory variables 
On the basis of the literature survey, I expect remittances to respond to a broad range of 
factors including demand-side and supply side characteristics.  In this regard, I include   
characteristics of the receiver, describing their human capital capability, household 
characteristics and proxies for various motivations. The relationship between sender and 




Specifically, the model includes: 
Demand side (receiver) characteristics such as age (in years), gender (Male=1), education 
attainment represented by four dummy variables for primary, secondary, post-secondary (or 
skilled training) and no education.  Marital status (married=1) is also framed as an indicator 
variable. 
 
I also include variables describing the environment/household of the receiver. This category 
includes location (rural=1) Location of residence, capturing whether the individual dwells in a 
rural area or otherwise. (Rural=1), number of children that live with the receiver, household 
size (number of people in their household) and household income level. 
A dummy variable indicating whether the person receives a state pension (OAP) or not; 
The relatedness between remitter and receiver is represented by two indicator variables 
o Dummy variable describing  nucleus family (parent, child)  versus  non-nucleus 
(other) relationship 




In addition to the relatedness indicator, there are Supply side (sender) pertaining to the sender. 
These are sender‟s age, gender, and educational attainment. To test remittance motives, and 
guided by theoretical considerations, I include a variable that captures every respondent‟s self-
evaluation of health status.  As defined in the data, this variable takes values of 1 to 5 as 
follows:  1=excellent; 2 =very good; 3 =good; 4=fair; 5=poor.   
 
The variable capturing number of other remitters is also a test for insurance motive (see 
Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002). To be clear, they use the variable to discriminate insurance from 
pure altruism. Under pure insurance, the number of other migrants should not affect other 
remittances. In contrast, under altruism where migrant remitters are concerned with the 
welfare of non-migrating household members, the presence of multiple remitting migrants will 
affect average level remittance level. 
 
Table 4.6 below presents the summary statistics of the variables defined above and used in the 
regression analysis in the next section.  Information is sourced from about 1247 survey 
respondents who reported that they had received remittances. In addition to their own 
personal characteristics, all respondents also supplied information about their relationship with 
and location of the sender. However, further information about the sender is only available in 
the household roster, which implies that only those remitters, who were members of the same 
household as the receiver, albeit non-resident, can be linked with the receiver. 
 
In the survey, only about 20 percent of the senders are non-resident household members. 
Therefore, in Table 4.6 below, I summarise sample characteristics of 1230 receivers and only 
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278 linked senders.  In turn, I estimate separate regressions for the sub sample with complete 
linked characteristics and the sample with only partially complete characteristics. 
Table 4.6 : Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Ln(remittance+1) 1230 6.07 3.27 0 11.91 
Receiver characteristics 











Male 1230 0.36 0.48 0 1 
No education 1230 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Primary school education 1230 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Secondary school education 1230 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Post-secondary school/skills training 1230 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Married 1228 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Children 1230 0.81 1.29 0 9 
State old age pension (OAP) 1228 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Household size 1230 4.27 2.88 1 25 
Household income (average monthly) 1230 7.10 0.97 1.79 10.81 
Life satisfaction 1115 4.75 2.59 1 10 
Health status 1222 2.33 1.27 1 5 
Rural 1230 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Nucleus family (relatedness) 1196 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Genetic relatedness 1196 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Number of other remitters 1230 0.101 0.39 0 4 
Remitter characteristics      
Age 278 40.05 11.63 14 75 
Male 278 0.65 0.48 0 1 
No education 262 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Primary education 262 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Secondary education 262 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Post-secondary education 262 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Notes: 
1. Source: author‟s calculation using NIDS wave one data (SALDRU, 2008).  
2. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  





4.9 Discussion of results 
 Table 4.7  below presents remittance equations based on two estimators:  ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and Tobit.  The sample used in these estimations comprises remitters only and 
hence are determinants of remittance income conditional on the respondent receiving 
remittances29. The fitting of a censored regression model is appropriate because some of the 
reported remittances are small in value, or indeed zeros, to the extent that they tend to zero 
when their natural log form is adopted in the equations.  
 
As expected, the parameters in the OLS model are smaller than those in the censored 
regression model.  Conditional on receiving remittances, the results in columns (1) and (2) of  
Table 4.7  indicate that being married and having a relationship (genetic or nucleus family) with 
a remittance sender is associated with higher remittances. The negative coefficient on the 
health status variable however suggests that poorer health on the part of potential receivers 
attracts lower remittances. Further, the receivers‟ household size, as it grows, will push down 
remittance levels. 
 
According to the estimators, there appears to be not enough evidence to statistically show a 
causal relationship between age, gender, number of children, presence of other remitters and 
household income, on the one hand, and remittances on the other. Further, the receipt of old 
age pension does not have any relationship with the amount of remittances one receives. 
Indeed, although only 6 percent of the sample receives old age pension from the state, this lack 
                                                 
29 While it would be ideal to fit the models on a sample comprising all potential remitters, the 
fact that remitters are not specifically attached to one household into which they may or may 
not send remittances makes the task challenging. 
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of evidence of the crowding out hypothesis between pensions and transfers is a surprising 
result. 
 
In columns 3 and 4 of table 4.7, additional predictors pertaining to the sender are included. 
However, since only those who were enumerated as (non-resident) household members can be 
identified, the sample is trimmed to about 20 percent of the full sample of remittance 
receivers. As noted in the descriptive summary of section 4.8, many of those who send 
remittances are related to the receivers but are not members of the same household. 
 
Table 4.7 : Determinants of remittance income [conditional on receiving remittances] 
Dependent variable: natural log of remittances sent by remitter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT 
     
Age -0.007 -0.013 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.027) 
Male -0.206 -0.177 -0.764 -0.880 
 (0.220) (0.270) (0.589) (0.725) 
Married 1.217*** 1.426*** -0.235 -0.344 
 (0.269) (0.329) (0.601) (0.734) 
Children 0.025 0.064 0.143 0.202 
 (0.094) (0.116) (0.153) (0.188) 
Old age state pension  0.632 0.801 -0.231 -0.192 
 (0.499) (0.614) (0.979) (1.214) 
hh_size -0.093** -0.108** -0.100 -0.111 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.074) (0.091) 
hh_income 0.121 0.122 -0.172 -0.206 
 (0.099) (0.121) (0.204) (0.248) 
Health -0.385*** -0.442*** -0.370** -0.414** 
 (0.081) (0.099) (0.169) (0.209) 
Otherremitters 0.302 0.423 0.836 1.027 
 (0.237) (0.289) (0.577) (0.708) 
Rural 0.213 0.101 0.551 0.545 
 (0.201) (0.247) (0.465) (0.572) 
core_rel 0.969*** 1.060*** 1.186* 1.472* 
 (0.206) (0.253) (0.641) (0.793) 
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genetic_rel 0.429** 0.565** -0.815 -0.779 
 (0.214) (0.263) (0.603) (0.740) 
age_remitter   0.024 0.021 
   (0.102) (0.125) 
agesqrd_remitter   -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
male_remitter   0.844* 1.171** 
   (0.456) (0.560) 
m_education2   0.523 0.663 
   (0.614) (0.758) 
m_education3   0.085 0.249 
   (0.590) (0.729) 
Constant 5.673*** 5.573*** 7.256*** 7.056** 
 (0.844) (1.035) (2.722) (3.343) 
Sigma    3.533*** 
    (0.189) 
Loglikelihood  -3037.15  -627.17 
R-squared 0.082  0.217  
Pseudo R-squared  0.0143  0.0415 
     
Observations 1,184 1,184 259 259 
Notes: 
1. *** (significant at 1%);   **  (significant at 5%) ;    * (significant at 10%) 
2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses  
3. Design weights are used in all estimations. 
 
 
The results provided in columns 3 and 4 may be understood as intra-household remittance 
determinants, conditional on remittances being sent/received. In these, relatedness of remitter 
and receiver is still significant, albeit weakly, but in the same direction of effect as in the first 
two columns. The health status variable is also significant and negative, again indicating that 
poorer health is associated with receiving lower remittances.  
 
According to the results in table 4.7, there is not enough statistical evidence to show that the 
receivers‟ human capital characteristics (age, gender, education attainment) have any 
association with remittance income levels. Interestingly, neither the presence of other remitters 
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nor the fact that a receiver also receives old age pension does not statistically affect the level of 
remittances that they get. 
 
The absence of a relationship between remittance level and the presence of other remitters 
could be interpreted using the model developed by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). Under pure 
insurance (or other self-interest motives), the number of other migrants would not affect own-
remittance. On the other hand, under altruism, average remittance level will be affected as 
remitters are concerned about the welfare of the non-migrating household members.   This 
result could  also corroborate the findings by Posel (2001) that there seems to be no income 
pooling in the household as various remitters do not behave any differently from single 
remitter . 
 
If the health status of the receiver matters, and relates positively with remittances, this could 
suggest that remittances are not a form of insurance for the remittance recipient. The 
statistically significant result on relatedness is not surprising as it is consistent with previous 
work (Posel, 2001; Bowles and Posel, 2005). 
 
Turning to the sub sample with more complete information, some characteristics remain 
statistically significant while other do not. Specifically, marital status and household size (on 
the part of the receiver) do not matter anymore for the level of remittances received. Instead, 
the receiver‟s health status and whether they consider themselves as nucleus family with the 




In a nutshell, a key result from this analysis is that there appears to be a strong linkage between 
the physical wellbeing of those who receive remittances and the amount that they receive. By 
extension, this could support the hypothesis that migration has elements of a co-insurance 
strategy among black South Africans.  Further, gender matters for remittance levels, but only 
to the extent that the results suggest that men send more than their female counterparts. The 
gender of the person receiving the remittance is not statistically important. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The motivation for remittances has been a subject of much debate in the development 
literature. In this chapter, I examine the determinants of remittances by testing the risk-sharing 
motive. If remittances are motivated by insurance motives, the presence or absence of other 
remitters should not significantly affect per migrant remittance levels. 
 
Employing data from the National Income Dynamics Survey, I find no evidence of 
remittances being affected by number of other migrants. In contrast, remittance levels seem to 
respond to the health status, which I use as a proxy for the state of the recipient. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Posel (2001), who suggested that the appropriate 
level of analysis for remittance behaviour is that of the individual rather than the household. 
 
However, an important caveat is that the regression results  should only be understood as being 
conditional on the fact that the data sample included only those that responded positively to 
the question of whether they had received remittances or not. Ideally, as we saw in the 
literature, remittance behaviour is best deciphered from the full sample of potential remitters 
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and, in the present case, receivers of remittances.   Further, the issue of self-selection on the 




5  Conclusion 
 
Recognising the important role that internal migration plays in the livelihoods of many poor 
people in developing countries, this thesis has attempted to empirically assess whether these 
economically induced movements of people can reduce income and wealth disparities between 
households in migrant sending communities. Broadly, the thesis is couched in the new 
economics of labour migration theory, which views labour migration as a diversification 
strategy which and therefore potentially beneficial to both migrants as well as for those who do 
not migrate but remain economically connected to the migrants.  The South African context, 
with a focus on the black population offers an interesting case study. 
 
5.1 Main findings 
The thesis purposely makes contributions to the empirical literature on the interface between 
migration and remittances, on the one hand, and poverty and inequality on the other. 
Specifically, it has attempted to address the question of whether migration and remittances 
affect intra and inter household welfare as well as what factors drive remittances.  
 
To assess the contribution of various household income sources to measures of poverty and 
inequality, I use decomposition techniques to unbundle the FGT Poverty index and Gini 
coefficient of inequality. Using South African income and expenditure data (IES), results show 
that remittances are relatively small in the aggregate income vector, but offer a non-negligible 




Although remittances form a significant portion of the incomes of those who receive, and 
hence could appear to make a dent on poverty, regression analysis in the third chapter does 
seem to suggest otherwise. That is, remittances do not necessarily reduce aggregate poverty.  
One possibility is that migration costs can be a serious barrier to some who would have 
wanted to migrate. Indeed, there is a suggestion that it is not always the poor that will migrate 
and find economic opportunities elsewhere.  The literature on migrants‟ selection also seems to 
support the view that migrants will self-select on the basis of characteristics such as 
entrepreneurial ability. In turn, if the migrant is successful, remittances would accrue to people 
who are not living below the poverty line. Furthermore, migration cannot be a panacea to 
poverty issues. Indeed, the process of migration can be a gamble and many end up 
unsuccessful in their search for better life. 
 
In attempting to further understand why migration may not always be a weapon again poverty, 
the thesis interrogates recent data on what determines remittances incomes. An effort is made 
to estimate a model that accounts for both sender and remitter attributes, as well as the 
motivational aspect. Following earlier literature on South African remittances, which suggest 
that the appropriate platform for the study of remittance determinants is not the household 
but the individual sender and receiver, chapter four purposely focuses on the individual 
characteristics of receivers and reported characteristics of sender to assess the insurance 
motive for remittances.  There seems to be strong suggestion, going against the grain of 
coinsurance theory, that migration and remittance behaviour do not reflect a co-insurance 
strategy on the part of black South Africans. Instead, people who are better off in terms of 
their self-assessed health status seem to attract higher remittances. Further, the amount that 
people send as remittances does appear to depend on whether the receiver is male or female. 
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However, the gender of the remitter appears to matter to the extent that men send more than 
women. In a nutshell, the message of this thesis is that while remittances evidently contribute 
to reduction in poverty and equality, causal relationships between the two are more complex. It 
is therefore important to understand the specific drivers and purposes of remittances in order 
to appropriately link migration and the well-being of migrant linked households.  
5.2 Directions for further research 
On the basis of the findings of this study, there are a number of prospects for future study. To 
begin with, the availability of household survey data with specific customisation for migration 
research would go a long way in contributing to innovative research. At present, specialised 
surveys and data sets are largely unavailable in South Africa and in most of the sub-Saharan 
Africa region.  Importantly, such data would be useful in understanding the dynamic 
relationship between migration and household welfare, whose empirical research has hugely 
relied on cross-sectional data. Indeed, future research will make useful contributions by 
designing surveys and collecting data that uncovers such dynamics.  
 
In the absence of panel data, the question of dynamic relationships between migration and 
household welfare could also be fruitfully pursued by using decomposition techniques that a 
series of cross-sectional survey data. Semi-parametric methods30 could be used to build 
counterfactuals and hence compare scenarios were migration happened against what would 
have obtained if out-migration had not happened. 
 
                                                 
30 For example, the semi parametric methods of  Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) 
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One aspect of remittance transfers that could be delved into is the costs of transmitting 
money. There is scope in researching whether costs could be an impediment to regular 
remittances and how policy changes could alleviate such a challenge if it exists. Drawing on the 
experience of countries like Kenya, which leads in money transfer technologies and 
participation by low income population, it would be illuminating to follow migrants and 
understanding how these new innovations and technologies have affected their remittance 
behaviour. Indeed, in recent years, the developing world has experienced rapid innovation in 
the use of money transfer products, both within and, most recently, between countries. It 
would be interesting for the research agenda to include investigations of how and whether 
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A3: Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A3.1  Instrumental Variable Regression  
Dependent variable:  expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
remittance -0.825*** -0.824*** -0.811*** -0.689*** -0.692*** -0.679*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) 
age 0.004 0.006* 0.000 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
age_sqrd -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
female_head -0.079*** -0.121*** -0.105*** -0.065*** -0.108*** -0.093*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
married 0.195*** 0.201*** 0.198*** 0.182*** 0.191*** 0.188*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
educ_primary 0.272***   0.287***   
 (0.025)   (0.025)   
educ_secondary 0.380***   0.418***   
 (0.030)   (0.029)   
educ_postsec 0.927***   0.960***   
 (0.039)   (0.040)   
n_infants -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.033*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 




1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3. Variable definitions are provided in table 3.1  
  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
adults_primaryedu -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.099*** -0.103*** -0.106*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
adults_secondaryedu 0.031** -0.085*** -0.059*** 0.027** -0.082*** -0.054*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
educ_average  0.077***   0.077***  
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
educ_maximum   0.056***   0.055*** 
   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Province dummies no no no yes yes yes 
Constant 8.578*** 8.355*** 8.681*** 8.535*** 8.379*** 8.699*** 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) (0.093) (0.091) (0.090) 
       
Observations 9,822 9,813 9,813 9,822 9,813 9,813 
R-squared 0.351 0.373 0.357 0.397 0.414 0.395 
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A4: Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table A4: Censored Least Absolute Deviation Estimation 
Dependent variable:  
remittance income 
  
   
Age -0.000 -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Male -0.276*** -0.353*** 
 (0.096) (0.000) 
Married 0.607*** -0.228*** 
 (0.097) (0.000) 
Children 0.128*** 0.249*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) 
hh_size -0.126*** -0.140*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) 
hh_income 0.130*** 0.205*** 
 (0.047) (0.000) 
Health -0.162*** -0.309*** 
 (0.031) (0.000) 
Otherremitters 0.078 0.292*** 
 (0.103) (0.000) 
Rural 0.524*** 1.287*** 
 (0.080) (0.000) 
core_rel 0.622*** 0.094*** 
 (0.086) (0.000) 
genetic_rel -0.172** -1.041*** 
 (0.086) (0.000) 
age_remitter  0.033*** 
  (0.000) 
agesqrd_remitter  0.000*** 
  (0.000) 
male_remitter  1.119*** 
  (0.000) 
m_education2  -0.126*** 
  (0.000) 
m_education3  0.392*** 
  (0.000) 
OAP -0.697***  
 (0.168)  
Constant 6.676*** 4.591*** 
 (0.372) (0.000) 
Observations 1,152 314 
1. *** (significant at 1%);   **  (significant at 5%) ;    * (significant at 10%) 
2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses  
3. Design weights are used in all estimations. 
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